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From the Editors
Drs. Laurence Weinstein and Shawn Blau served as editors for the recent Thomson publication, Best Practices in
Entrepreneurship: Readings from the New England Journal of Entrepreneurship. Twenty-four of what we considered to
be the best interviews and manuscripts over the first five years of the Journal’s existence are included. Instructors,
researchers, and students alike are offered a variety of insights, theories, and applications in the study of entrepreneur-
ial behavior. The soft-cover book is now available. If interested, please contact Ms. Julie Howell at Julie.howell@thom-
sonlearning.com for ordering information.
An announcement was made in our Spring 2002 issue (Volume 5, Number 1) that Dr. James Santomier, Director of
the Sport Management program at Sacred Heart University, was planning to serve as Guest Editor for the Spring 2003
issue on the special focus topic of Sport Business Entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, we have had to delay the issue
because we did not receive sufficient manuscript submissions to provide our readers with a comprehensive look at this
topic.
We believe, as James Santomier does, that the entrepreneurial spirit is flourishing in the sports industry and is well
worth the attention of our readers and prospective authors. We hope that we can return to this area of interest in the
near future. In the meantime, readers who do want to keep up with sport business entrepreneurship are referred to the
Journal of Sport Management and Sport Marketing Quarterly.
Dr. Blau’s recent MBA class in entrepreneurship at Sacred Heart University placed four business plans in the top 10
in the State of Connecticut Collegiate Business Plan Competition, sponsored by the Connecticut Department of
Economic and Community Development. This was the greatest number of finalists from any university in the state.
Robert Mather, an MBA student at Sacred Heart, won a $10,000 prize for his business plan for “Connecticut Eldercare,
LLC.”
Finally, for the purposes of disclosure to our readers, Dr. Joshua Shuart, Associate Editor, is the son of 
R. Stephen Shuart, one of the Journal’s two featured entrepreneurs in this issue.
Dr. Laurence Weinstein Dr. Shawn Blau Christopher Sheehan Dr. Joshua Shuart
Editor Managing Editor Associate Editor Associate Editor
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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C raig Hoekenga is CEO of Microboard Processing,Inc. (MPI), a very successful subcontract electron-ics manufacturing company located in Seymour,
Connecticut. There are many reasons why Hoekenga
would stand out in any gathering of CEOs, but one of the
most arresting reasons would be that Hoekenga credits his
success to God and considers MPI a “Christian business.”
The New England Journal of Entrepreneurhip editors 
started with a plant tour and then caught up with
Hoekenga in his office.
NEJE: Things seem to be really busy in your factory
area. Hasn’t the recent slowdown in the telecommuni-
cations field hurt your sales?
Hoekenga: Yes, our revenue is down a few percentage
points from the same period last year, but not anywhere
near the disastrous drop-off that some of our competitors
are experiencing. In fact, despite the problems we’ve
encountered with the telecommunications industry, our
profit has stayed pretty much the same over the past three
years.
NEJE: How come?
Hoekenga: I can’t pat ourselves on the back and say we
saw this whole high-tech downturn coming. That wasn’t
the case at all. But we are ferocious when it comes to cut-
ting costs and improving productivity, and we have learned
to adapt quickly to changes in the marketplace. We have
worked hard to get to where we are today. I believe that
God has been with us as well.
NEJE: You have prints of Jesus Christ in and around
your office and a carved wooden plaque that says
“Jesus is your ‘master.’” Have you always been so
deeply religious?
Hoekenga: No, I left religion when I was 17 years old and
didn’t return for roughly 20 years. I had a religious conver-
sion on a plane coming home from California on one of my
frequent trips to the West Coast and I’ve been a different
person for the last 20 years. 
NEJE: What happened exactly?
Hoekenga: I was consulting three days a week for compa-
nies like IBM, GE, GTE, and UTC because I had gotten
quite a reputation for fixing corporate problems in 
operations. I was leaving Connecticut every Monday night,
and not returning until Thursday night, earning in excess of
$500,000 a year during the 1980s, when I heard God
speaking to me on a flight home from San Francisco.
Basically, He told me to quit consulting and pay more
attention to a small side business I was involved in at the
time.
NEJE: How was this side business doing?
Hoekenga: Oh, not particularly well. I owned a small 
telecom equipment repair business with 50 employees
generating about $3 million in business each year. When I
returned to run this business in late 1990, I felt we would
have to get out of the repair business (about $2 million of
the $3 million and concentrate all of our efforts on manu-
facturing). The problem was we needed $1.5 million in
machinery to get started and all I had was $5,000 in the
bank.
NEJE: Did we miss something here? You were earning
a huge amount of money every year, but all you had
was $5,000 in cash?
Hoekenga: That’s right, when I returned to God, I prom-
ised I would give Him my excess income each year and
sell the property I had acquired, and give the proceeds to
world missions. Therefore, I had only $5,000 in the bank at
this time.
NEJE: Did your wife or children say something like,
“Craig, have you lost it? Why are you walking away
from all that money?”
Hoekenga: No. As a matter of fact, my wife was delighted
with my decision. She said she had been praying for years
that some day I would come back to the church and
change my lifestyle and now that I was walking with the
Lord she would support any decision I made. My dad, a
church deacon, was very supportive of my decision as
well.
NEJE: How did you manage to “find” the $1.5 million
you needed?
Hoekenga: That was an interesting experience! Or,
should I say, set of experiences. While I was thinking how
exactly we were going to get into the subcontract electron-
ics business around 1990, we were approached by sever-
al businesses in the area asking if we wanted to take used
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machinery and assorted business inventory off their
hands. Remember, there was a serious recession in
1991–92 and companies were scrambling to raise cash.
We were good negotiators and we managed eventually
to buy millions of dollars of physical assets located in area
warehouses for just pennies on the dollar and then resell
the equipment for much more than we paid for it or use it
in our facility. In the course of less than 90 days we had
raised the money we needed to buy our capital equipment
and/or had acquired it through inventories we had pur-
chased. That was the first miracle I saw God perform in our
business.
NEJE: That’s certainly not something you learned in
college!
Hoekenga: No, in fact I never graduated from college. I
attended Michigan State University and I was in my fresh-
man year when my dad told me he could not afford to pay
my tuition bills. He had six other children to consider. I was
working 45–50 hours a week as a custodian but it wasn’t
enough to keep me in school so I returned to Connecticut
and went to night school at the University of New Haven
for five years. I was two courses from graduating when I
started my first business.
NEJE: What happened next?
Hoekenga: I returned to Connecticut and worked first for
Exide Battery, then took a job with Remington Shaver
Products in Bridgeport managing the customer correspon-
dence group. Within two years, I was put in charge of its
144 service centers and had 550 people working with me.
I also suggested a direct mail campaign to warranty card-
holders because I figured they were an untapped “gold
mine” for the company. A good direct mail response rate is
2 percent. We achieved a 22 percent response rate!
During my time at Remington, I really wanted to work on
my own, so with another Remington employee, I offered to
buy about 20 of the centers and we expanded the busi-
ness to include working on Norelco, Schick, Ronson,
Braun, GE, and many other small appliance manufactur-
ers.
Victor Kiam bought Remington a few years later and
asked me for help in turning around the rest of their 
service centers. They just weren’t making any money for
the company. That was my first consulting job and I contin-
ued to consult for many Fortune 500 companies over the
next 15 years. 
NEJE: The business then morphed over the years into
MPI.
Hoekenga: Yes it did. MPI was started in 1983 and I start-
ed to run it full time in 1991. Now we do business with
some of the biggest names in the industry including JDS
Uniphase, Intel, IBM, NEC, and ASML. In fact, we recent-
ly built the systems that overhauled the entire East Coast
Air Defense System, run the train system in Italy, and we
have built millions of the in-store coupon dispensers that
you see in supermarkets around the country.
NEJE: Do you always know what the end result will be
for the boards you build for customer orders?
Hoekenga: No, many times we don’t know until after the
fact, since we build to our customer’s specifications. For
instance, for one of our customers we built the systems
that helped the Montgomery County, Maryland, police han-
dle all the phone calls coming in on the recent sniper case
in the D.C. area. The system worked so well our customer
congratulated us for our part in a successful conclusion to
the whole situation (much to our surprise) and told us the
state of Maryland would be following up with orders for
more systems.
NEJE: Another thing we noticed during the plant tour
was every station has a computer monitor.
Hoekenga: The monitors you noticed are used by our
employees to keep in touch with customer changes in
board manufacturing requirements. We are as close to
paperless in our manufacturing operation as we can be. It
took a bright young engineer 18 months to help develop
the software, but after a six-year commitment to upgrading
our systems, we are now one of the leaders in the indus-
try. Others talk about “going paperless on the manufactur-
ing floor,” we truly are.
NEJE: How has your company managed to keep prof-
itability up in a very difficult business environment?
Hoekenga: We run a conservative business. We like to
hold onto cash and negotiate with our suppliers from a
position of strength. We negotiate better deals that way. For
instance, we pay our invoices within 10 days and ask for a
3 percent discount. That equates to 102 percent on an
annual basis. I don’t understand why other companies
aren’t taking advantage of the same opportunity. Instead,
they try to treat their suppliers like bankers and stretch out
their payments for up to six months. The suppliers, know-
ing this and figuring that some of these clients won’t pay
their invoices at all, have increased their prices to reflect
this risk of doing business. With us, they know they’ll be
paid immediately and there is no risk at all. We get terrific
pricing that way.
However, I urge our purchasing department to be fair
and not ask for a deeper discount than the supplier can
reasonably afford. We recently set goals of reducing our
company costs by 20 percent. We had one instance where
one of our employees actually negotiated a 25 percent
reduction. I looked into it and thought it was unfair to our
supplier. I asked the employee to call back and say we
would be pleased to receive a 20 percent discount and to
adjust their prices back up 5 percent. You can imagine the
surprise on the other end of the phone. Yet I think it was the
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right thing to do because when the economy gets going
again, this supplier won’t drop us because it resented us
squeezing its margins so much. After all, the supplier has
to show a profit at the end of the day just as we do.
NEJE: What about “bad debt” in this current environ-
ment?
Hoekenga: Since 1991 right up to today, we’ve had a
grand total of $18,000 we’ve had to write off. That’s it. I
believe God has protected us and we’ve worked hard at
our client relationships. “Bad debt” has not been a problem
for us to date.
NEJE: What about inventory write-downs, especially
when the telecom industry orders deteriorated so
badly the past two years?
Hoekenga: We saw a potential loss of millions of dollars in
inventory literally overnight. It was scary. But we have a
terrific management team here and we put our heads
together to come up with solutions. We had to write down
some of our inventory but it was no more than a few hun-
dred thousand dollars. We are coming out of this business
cycle stronger than ever and I think 2003 will see tremen-
dous growth for us.
NEJE: You’ve certainly beaten the odds. Yet you dress
casually and don’t seem to reflect the fact you must be
worth millions.
Hoekenga: On the contrary, I don’t own anything. Like the
biblical Job, I came into the world naked and naked I will
leave. I don’t even own a car. Whatever excess money 
I have at the end of the year goes to world mission 
projects.
NEJE: You own nothing?
Hoekenga: My wife is taken care of because she has
income property in her name, and our three children
together own income property. I put the company in a 25-
year charitable trust; 11 years are gone since I started the
trust with 14 more years to go. In 2016, our children can
decide what to do with the company; it will be their deci-
sion, not mine. I pray they will continue to help others as
they do today. The present management can run the busi-
ness with or without them.
NEJE: What jobs do they have here in the company?
Hoekenga: They don’t. I wouldn’t let them stay here after
graduate school even though each one of them was a
great employee. I insisted they leave for at least 10 years
before they consider coming back. Do I miss them? Sure I
do! However, I believe it’s best for their own growth 
experiences to have independent experiences before
committing themselves to any business. They may 
choose not to come back to MPI and I would be fine with
that.
NEJE: During the site tour, we couldn’t help noticing a
lot of the employees are ethnically diverse.
Hoekenga: “Minorities” make up 70 percent of our factory
workforce, and we just promoted a woman to vice 
president of engineering.
NEJE: Is this part of your doing God’s work?
Hoekenga: Yes, it is. Our initial factory was located near
Bridgeport, Connecticut, which has a large minority popu-
lation. We were approached by local clergy who asked us
to hire city residents, some of whom had never been able
to hold down a full-time job before or who had addiction
issues, such as drug and alcohol, been in prison, or were
unemployed and/or physically or mentally challenged.
We worked closely with several area churches and
we’ve hired dozens of people who many other companies
would have considered too risky or too hard to train.
Believe me, we’ve had our share of failures, but we’ve also
had wonderful success stories like the gang leader who
showed up one day and asked for a job.
I thought he was kidding, but he was earnest in his
approach to me so I hired him. There were employees in
the beginning who were very afraid of him, but he stayed
for years and became a team leader. We believe strongly
in giving every human being a second chance. Our human
resources department gets stretched a bit working with
some of our employees. We need to understand and be
sensitive to the time it takes for them to appreciate what it
means to work regularly and do consistently excellent
work.
NEJE: How long is that?
Hoekenga: We remain patient with every new person and
work hard with them to develop their innate skills. I know
this isn’t a prescription for everyone. I’d say our success
ratio is around 50 percent. Some employees turn back to
the streets, drugs, or liquor. I’m upset when that happens.
But for those who make it, we’re proud of them because
they’ve broken the cycle of poverty and despair.
NEJE: How have your neighbors reacted to this com-
mitment to giving employees a second chance?
Hoekenga: Sorry to say, not always well. Before we
moved to Seymour, we had selected another site in a town
adjoining Bridgeport and I had pretty much sealed the deal
with the building contractor with a handshake. We commit-
ted to spending $4 million on a new plant location. At a
local planning and zoning meeting, I was confronted by
people who said they were afraid I was going to hire mur-
derers and former prisoners, who during their lunch breaks
would threaten their children with harm.
I was surprised at their anger and their fears. I told
everyone in the room that at no time during our company’s
history did anyone associated with MPI do anything 
harmful or threatening during work hours, but our 
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prospective neighbors remained adamant. When we 
realized what we were up against, we told them we would
look elsewhere.
The very next day, this property in Seymour became
available. It took the previous occupant $5.5 million to
build our present facility, but we were able to purchase it
for $2 million. I’ve learned that when one door closes,
another opens up. It’s God’s way of increasing our faith.
NEJE: As a Christian business, do you proselytize to
your employees or to the people your company has
relationships with?
Hoekenga: No, not at all. I noticed once that several
young employees who had done some missionary work
before coming to work here had started to write inspira-
tional messages on outgoing products. I put an immediate
stop to it. It’s just not appropriate.
We have a Christian prayer session every Thursday
during lunch hour and folks can join in or not. We have a
chapel near the front of the building and employees know
they are welcomed to use it any time. We also have a fund
set aside so that any employee can borrow up to $300
once each year, interest free, with no questions asked to
get over a little bump in the road.
Also, when it comes time to divvy up the profit at the
end of the year, we take care of all of our employees 
starting with factory bonuses first. We have a caring atti-
tude around Microboard and the folks who work here
reciprocate by working hard. Sometimes their commitment
to the company goes a bit overboard and I literally have to
chase them out of here at night. 
NEJE: What keeps you motivated?
Hoekenga: I love change. I embrace it. Technology drives
everything we do here at MPI and with the frenetic
dynamism we face, no two days here are the same. Ever.
You might have 10 projects you’re working on, get one
done and be forced to temporarily put the other 9 on hold,
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T he Reverend R. Stephen Shuart is an Episcopalpriest by profession. He is rector of two parishesand serves on the Diocesan Financial Committee
and as a rural dean. However, he has spent most of his
wage-earning life as owner/operator of Stephen Shuart
Export Co., an internationally known photographic 
business, located in Kane, Pennsylvania. Shuart’s unique
entrepreneurial endeavor has been the subject of a 
televised news feature, and the object of camera collec-
tors’ attention since his company’s inception in the early
1970s.
NEJE: Please describe your business for us.
Shuart: I deal with photographic mail order. I have sold
what is termed “photographica”—just about anything that
can be shipped by USPS, UPS or FedEx. My customers
are mostly serious amateur photographers, with a smatter-
ing of collectors and those who are nostalgic.
Photographers, collectors of photographic history and
equipment, books on photography, photographs, libraries,
museums, etc. Just about anyone with an interest in 
photography, but not necessarily photographers.
I’d say my customers are probably 50 percent collec-
tors, 25 percent professional, and 25 percent
nostalgia…such as Korean War Veterans that were 
photographers, and now want a camera outfit like they
used in the military.
Initially, I advertised in Shutterbug (originally Shutterbug
Ads). I was a “ground-floor” advertiser in the early 1970s
when it was published in a back room. In the beginning the
magazine was all classified ads. I was the first full-page
display advertiser (actually two pages).  This was 1977.
That in itself changed the nature of my business and the
magazine. How I came to be the first display advertiser is
a story in itself.
NEJE: We’d be glad to hear it.
Shuart: Sure. In January 1977 I attended the PMA (Photo
Marketing Association) in Chicago. It was an opportunity
for a lookaround. Although it was all new equipment and
that really wasn’t my interest, I thought it an opportunity to
develop contacts. At the Chicago convention, I met Glenn
Patch, publisher of Shutterbug. As an aside, Glenn went
on to be very successful in publishing (Computer Shopper,
a series of used aviation reselling magazines, databases,
etc.). He had worked at Link Aviation in the 1960s and had
early computer knowledge. He built his own computer
typesetters and printing presses. Over a bottle of scotch in
the hotel bar, he convinced me to move from classified to
display advertising. The end result, the following month, I
ran two full-page displays. Within 60 days, I had quadru-
pled my business.
For a period of 12 to14 years, I staked out the inside
back cover of the magazine. People read the magazine in
this fashion: front, inside front cover, flip it over and read
inside back pages and work toward the front. So I was in
a good position. My customers could find me in the same
spot every month.
NEJE: So your business grew slowly and solidly. Can
you talk more specifically about how your business
developed?
Shuart: Actually, it developed out of necessity. I was a 
collector. I supported my “habit” by buying and selling. One
day I decided not to be a collector, and so I went to 
full-time dealing.
My business started when I was in high school. I bought
a Leica from a teacher, and sold it a few years later at a
profit. That was about 1959. I did a lot of high school 
photography. I liked equipment, good equipment. I was too
busy in college to do photography, but picked up on it in
graduate school. It was a good hobby. Later when my wife
and I started our family, my interest peaked in photograph-
ic history. As a hobbyist, I did a lot of trading, buying, and
selling. I started turning a profit, and it grew into a 
business. As my family grew, I needed more money, so I
decided to make it a full-time profession. Some of what
happened in the very beginning was simply by chance, like
a career-changing experience in Pittsburgh about 25 years
ago. 
NEJE: And that was…?
Shuart: While I was at the PMA, I landed a sales job with
Amphoto, the largest photo publisher in the United States
(and the world). I called on Pennsylvania stores. My real
interest was to get into stores looking for good used equip-
ment. At one Pittsburgh store in July 1977, I was asked by
the buyer to meet with the owner. The owner laid out that
he had been asked to make an appraisal, but couldn’t do
it because the woman was the widow of a deceased coun-
ty commissioner...and about 50 percent of their sales went
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to the county. It would clearly be a conflict of interest.
I made arrangements to meet with this party. At her
home, I came upon room upon room of select equip-
ment—from Leicas to sophisticated stereo cinematograph-
ic equipment. After six hours of appraising, I handed her
an appraisal of $80,000 (resale value based on retail),
explaining that she could expect to find someone who
might pay her only about one third to one fifth that value,
again somewhat less, but she would need to find the right
person. You must understand, this stuff could, and some-
times does (in similar situations), end up being taken by
the owners to the dump.
She asked me if I bought such equipment and I replied
that if I had the money, I would happily give her $20,000 on
the spot, but that I had just used every cent I had on a
house down payment and was flat broke. She responded,
“Would you give me $1,000 for everything?”  I replied that
I would happily give her $1,000, but I was overwhelmed
having bought my first house, had five mouths to feed, and
really didn’t know where I’d come up with the cash. She
said, “Do you know how to write postdated checks?” My
response was that I was pretty expert at that, so I wrote
her two $500 checks. Her desire was that I remove every-
thing immediately, so the next two days I spent moving
everything.
Within a week, I instructed her to cash her checks and
within six weeks, I had about $20,000 from the sale of the
equipment in my checking account. This would serve as
my “working capital.” It was a bonanza and there was no
looking back from that point.
NEJE: That’s quite a start. 
Shuart: Yes, but it began to snowball as I got the hang of
it. In the spring of 1978, another dealer friend, Ted
Bromwell, who had studied law at Yale, but ended up as a
buyer for the May Co. (and later in a responsible manage-
ment position in Pittsburgh), called my attention to a
scheduled federal bankruptcy of a photo supplier in
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. We met there the day before
the sale to look at the goods. It was clearly a situation of a
successful business gone sour by bad inventory manage-
ment. The merchandise available was all new, so we
planned to bid to $5,000—Ted paying one third and I 
paying two thirds. He would walk away with three cartons
of new cameras, all of which would fit in the trunk of his
Volkswagen Rabbit. I would spend three days moving
three truckloads of good stuff.
There was one hobbyist bidder at the auction and the
hammer went down at $3,000. The bank, of course, was
extremely disappointed. Ted and I escaped to the bar
across the street to celebrate. This purchase put $10,000
into my account within a week. Then I made a sale to my
hometown drug store—printing paper, film, and prepaid
film mailers. Within the month I had cleared over $30,000.
It was another bonanza.
The owner of the store insisted on immediate removal
but then said that if we would give him a good Polaroid
camera, he would give me two days. It was something that
we needed to do. With the sale came everything not nailed
down in the shop—tools, fixtures, showcases, everything.
Having filled the third truckload, I was getting ready to
wrap it up and pay three workers that I had hired for the
move, when he said, “I want those three-ring binders in the
basement out of here.” I then realized that I hadn’t even
been in the basement yet! There were about 5,000 three-
ring binders, imprinted with the company name, that were
used to bind the catalog that this company sold. It was a
buying club, by subscription. So we loaded them in the
truck and off I went. On the way back to my home, I
passed by State College, Pennsylvania, and thought that
maybe I could sell some of the binders to the Penn State
University bookstore. They were good quality and when I
offered to sell 200 cases of 20 binders at $0.25 each
binder, the buyer jumped on it, had some of his workers
off-load them. In 30 days I received a check for $1,000,
and I continued to sell the rest locally. They were all sold
within the year. This was another turning point that put
thousands of dollars in my account. 
NEJE: What were some of the unique factors that
made your business different from others in the field?
Shuart: My business was unique from others in that I was
on the ground floor, that I moved to dealing in Europe in
the late 1970s, and that I was able to find interesting items
that people seem to find of interest—items that no one
else had, like European-published books on photography,
and photographic tools. It seemed as though I was a per-
son that people looked to see what certain items were
worth. I was being asked to do a lot of professional
appraising.
My philosophy has always been simple: I zero in on a
product that has little or no competition, and then when I
am “‘found out” or others start selling the item, I move
swiftly into something new. Profit is everything. 
NEJE: You’ve mentioned a couple of times that you
were “on the ground floor.” What does this mean?
Shuart: I was basically dealing directly with camera collec-
tors. Camera collecting came into its own around 1969. I
got started in the business in 1971, right at the beginning.
NEJE: Would you consider yourself a niche marketer?
Shuart: Absolutely. Many people have said they scan my
ads because there they find something interesting or
unusual that no one else has.
I have always dealt in niche areas. I would pick up on
an item, set the price, others would see that I was obvious-
ly making a buck, then begin to imitate. Usually, they had
no imagination. There would then be several, the supply
would grow, the price would decline, and then I would 
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transition into something new and let them beat each other
over the head. Transition is the key to surviving niche 
marketing. Transition is the key to staying alive in any 
business.
NEJE: You say that “transition” is the key. Were there
specific things that you did yourself to ease the 
transitions?
Shuart: Things change. Buyers change their wants. Other
competitors come along selling in the same niche. All of a
sudden there are two to three selling the same item. This
is the time to bail out and move into something else. It is
important to know when to make the move…and you 
better have some new item to market.
NEJE: You have an interesting educational back-
ground. Can you tell us about that, and how it might
have influenced your business development?
Shuart: I graduated from a New Jersey school and attend-
ed a small, liberal arts Lutheran college in Pennsylvania.
That was in the early 1960s, just about the time that no
one was studying Latin and it was dropped from most high
school curricula. Frankly, the demand for Latin teachers
was nil. I also studied Greek—New Testament Greek—
having some interest in the Church. I was still in the study
mode and decided to enroll in a seminary, the Berkeley
Divinity School (at Yale). After I spent three years in “theo-
logical study,” having married and having our first child, I
needed a job. So I took the ordination route and landed
two small churches in Pennsylvania, a place that I had
come to like from my college experience.
Seminary is an interesting experience: a place where
you learn to live in a community of people. You are intel-
lectually challenged and you learn a lot of basic life skills.
You also learn some basic business practices, how to
relate to people, institution work and life, and many other
things. Some say it is the cheap M.B.A. What I learned in
seminary enhanced my developing business. 
Education never hinders anything. The skills I acquired
while a student there, and while traveling in Europe from
1964–1966, cannot be understated. I attribute my success
to the good education that I received, plus hard work.
NEJE: You sound very busy! How do you balance your
business with your other jobs? 
Shuart: Time management, which I am not real good at, I
admit. But I have found that the busier I am, the more pro-
ductive I am.
As my business grew, balancing my profession as a
priest of the Episcopal Church and my hobby-turned-busi-
ness was a real task. I was consumed by the demands of
the church on one hand and a rapid growing business on
the other. At the same time my family grew to five and my
church income was not what I deemed necessary to raise
them the way I wanted. I decided to go the business route.
It was an easy decision, because at this point, I was able
to exceed my entire yearly church salary with a single 
business transaction, completed over a two- to three-day
period. So I went full steam ahead with the business.
Nonetheless, I was to return to my church job at a later
date, being able to balance both professions. More on that
later.
NEJE: To me, it is very interesting that you used your
seminary background to enhance your own business.
Shuart: Seminary education was paramount. Besides the
theological education, time is spent in practical matters.
When you are graduated, you have the skills to run a 
business. There are a lot of practical courses, other than
just New and Old Testament. Much emphasis is spent on
interpersonal relationships. You need to know how to talk
to people, and deal with them. People have a lot of 
problems, and you become a skilled problem solver. It is
very helpful in the business.
I spent two weeks in Washington, D.C. in 1976, testing
to see what my church interest was and whether to move
into the business world full-time. It was there I learned that
much of what I had learned was transferable into another
profession.
When I was hired by Amphoto to sell books, I asked the
president why he was hiring me? He said, “If you can sell
something as abstract as the church, you can sell books!”
NEJE: How do you advertise, and has that changed
with new technology?
Shuart: Rapidly changing and new technology and the
advent of the Internet have drastically changed the man-
ner in which I now do business. As I mentioned earlier
“transitioning” is the key to survival and/or growth in any
business. I spent about 15 to 20 percent of my gross sales
in advertising during the good years, then at the advent of
the Internet, I was beginning to spend upwards of 50 per-
cent of my gross. Something was wrong. The Internet had
taken the lack of supply to an abundance of supply, prices
dropped, demand dropped, and the world economy
changed. The foreign buyer was no longer there. It was a
new game, it was time for a transition.
I advertised aggressively in several trade journals
(mostly Shutterbug). When newspaper advertising
became ineffective about 3 to 4 years ago, I switched to
Internet site and auctions.  
NEJE: Why are you located in Kane, Pennsylvania?
Shuart: A mail-order business can be run from anywhere.
I was already living here. My kids were in school, and the
schools were good. It was a safe place. I like rural. I could
hunt and fish. It was the ideal for me. Housing was cheap.
In terms of location, I can reach the following places in my
car: New York, 5.5 hours; Toronto, 3.5 hours; Buffalo, 
2 hours; Cleveland, 3 hours; Pittsburgh, 2.5 hours;
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Chicago, 9 hours; D.C., 5 hours; and Boston, 9 hours.
The quality of life was the best, isn’t that a good reason?
NEJE: Sure. What you would consider to be the most
interesting thing you have experienced during your
business career?
Shuart: When I took my business to Europe in late 1978,
I was clearly on the ground floor. There was no other
American doing what I was doing. Inflation was at a record
high. People wanted to get rid of cash, and they wanted
hard goods. The American dollar was at its weakest
against the German mark and all European currencies.
The trick is simple: get paid high prices in foreign curren-
cies, convert to bagloads of U.S. dollars. I carried all the
goods as baggage. I took a friend or relative with me.
There were always four bags of goods, and two carry-on
bags of clothes. Each trip was five to six days, and all
goods were sold. And while I was there, I picked up inter-
esting European equipment, which I brought back and
resold stateside. I also bought European collector books,
which were duty-free. Most stuff passed duty-free in
Europe and in the United States.
NEJE: You’ve mentioned you have an international
reputation.
Shuart: I spent five years in Europe selling until other
dealers got the idea. By that time, the monetary situation
changed. It really wasn’t that profitable anymore. Maybe
just enough to support a European vacation. The niche
was disappearing and it was time to make a transition.
I was back to the mail-order business full-time, with all
my European contacts. Now I was able to deal with my
new contacts at a distance. No more travel, more UPS and
FedEx. It worked.
NEJE: Earlier, you said that you were able to “return”
to the church. What is the current status of all of your
career ventures?
Shuart: In 1989, we experienced a bit of a “camera reces-
sion.” I was still being carried by the diocesan medical
plan, but there was a substantial spike in the cost and I
was paying for it out of pocket. About this time the local
cure was vacant and they were looking for an interim. I
approached the congregation with the idea that I would
work for a year while they did a search. I was paid in tax-
free housing allowance and medical. The medical
stretched over a two-year period, as they would keep me
on as an assistant the second year. That seemed to solve
my current slowdown in business. 
In a year they called a new rector, who stayed for three
years. Then I seized the opportunity for a full-time (really
only part-time at 15 hours per week) position. That was in
1993. This solved my medical insurance problems, and
gave me tax-free housing. It is all quite legal, and, oh yes,
the pension!
—J.S.
(Editor’s Note: Since this interview, Father Shuart began
serving an additional parish, 30 miles down the
road…part-time, of course!)
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Marketing orientation refers to a culture in which organiza-
tions strive to create superior value for their customers
(and superior performance for the business) by focusing
on customer needs and long-term profitability. Some stud-
ies have found that firms with a high degree of marketing
orientation experience improved performance; others have
found mixed or nonsignificant results. The marketing ori-
entation of small businesses has not been thoroughly
investigated, however. This study of more than 200 small
business CEOs examines the marketing orientation levels
of small to medium-sized firms (SMEs) as well as the
impact of various internal variables (sales/profit perform-
ance, company characteristics, and CEO characteristics)
on marketing orientation levels. The results confirm some
earlier research on marketing orientation and provide new
insights into this important strategic dimension.
The role of marketing orientation in a firm’s businessstrategy has been debated extensively since themarketing concept was formally introduced 50 years
ago. Described as the “implementation of the marketing
concept” (Kohli and Jaworski 1990), marketing orientation
refers to a culture in which organizations strive to create
superior value for their customers (and superior perform-
ance for the business) by focusing on customer needs and
long-term profitability (Narver and Slater 1990).
Specifically, marketing orientation has been defined as the
process of: (1) generating marketing intelligence, (2) dis-
seminating marketing intelligence, and (3) responding to
marketing intelligence in order to provide superior cus-
tomer value (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater
1990). These definitions highlight recent debates about
whether marketing orientation encompasses a specific set
of organizational behaviors or a type of organizational cul-
ture (see Slater and Narver 1995, for example). In any
event, marketing orientation has been definitively linked to
multiple areas of firm strategy and business performance.
Of the considerable research that has been conducted
on marketing orientation, however, very little has focused
on the small to mid-sized enterprise. Yet, in SMEs, there is
great potential for the CEO’s vision to be reflected strong-
ly in the organizational characteristics and operations.
Much as an entrepreneurial firm is the expression of the
founder’s vision and philosophy, so the continued 
operation of small and mid-sized firms reflects the priori-
ties and marketplace perspective of the company’s CEO.
As noted by Carson and Gilmore (2000), marketing in
SMEs is often “dominated by the inherent characteristics
of the entrepreneur/owner/manager of the SME itself” (p.
1). The unique aspects of SMEs and their entrepreneurial
founders/managers often lead to a type of “implicit market-
ing planning” that is less formal, less structured, and less
sequential than traditional marketing frameworks.
Informal, intuitive and context-specific marketing practices
that reflect the style and influence of the entrepreneurs
tend to evolve (Carson 1993).
In addition, much of the existing research on marketing
orientation has focused on the external environment rather
the internal environment. For example, industry character-
istics such as market turbulence or market growth, com-
petitive conditions such as hostility or intensity, and even
the degree of technological turbulence have all been
examined. The internal environment has been investigat-
ed, but the characteristics studied were more suited to
large-firm research such as decentralization (Jaworski and
Kohli 1993; Pelham and Wilson 1996), formalization
(Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Pelham and Wilson 1996), and
interfunctional coordination/connectedness (Jaworski and
Kohli 1993; Atuahene-Gima 1996; Pelham and Wilson
1996; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Han, Kim, and
Srivastava 1998). More recently Coviello et al. (2000)
investigated size-related differences in how SMEs
approach such marketing activities as market planning
and market performance. Their results were mixed regard-
ing the effect of size, and they point out the importance of
learning more about when and why differences do exist
between different size firms.  In general, however, few
internal factors focusing on the SME, and especially the
firm leader, have been investigated relative to marketing
orientation.
Our research objective, therefore, is to explore the cir-
cumstances in the internal environment under which mar-
keting orientation varies in small and mid-sized firms.
Specifically, what levels of marketing orientation are
observed in SMEs? In addition, under what company,
leader, and performance characteristics are low marketing
orientation levels observed?   Under what conditions will
marketing orientation remain high? The specific internal
variables examined include performance of the SME in
Marketing Orientation in SMEs:
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terms of sales and profit, characteristics of the company
(e.g., size and scope of the business), and characteristics
of the company CEO such as age, education, decision-
making style, and entrepreneurial experience.
Theoretical Background
Marketing orientation has been linked to business out-
comes such as sustainable competitive advantage (Narver
and Slater 1990; Pelham and Wilson 1996), profitability
(Narver and Slater 1990), new product innovation (Lukas
and Ferrell 2000), and overall firm performance (Jaworski
and Kohli 1993; Slater and Narver 1994). Recently,
Pelham (2000) in one of the few studies focusing on
SMEs, found marketing orientation to have a strong 
relationship with performance. While the importance of
marketing orientation in determining various aspects of
business performance has been well documented, some
inconsistent findings have still emerged. For example,
Greenley (1995) found no direct influence of marketing 
orientation on performance. Pelham and Wilson (1996)
found that while marketing orientation did influence new
product success, it did not impact growth or market share,
two critical marketing performance measures.
The problem of inconsistent findings is compounded
when firm size, strategy, and other environmental charac-
teristics are examined. Large firms have been noted for
their marketing responsiveness (Day and Nedungadi
1994). Yet small firms should be better suited to the adop-
tion of a marketing orientation since their greater response
speed (Katz 1970), flexibility (Feigenbaum and Karnani
1991), and ability to exploit marketing niches (Caroll 1994)
have all been noted. Do small firms exhibit high levels of
marketing orientation, and if so, under what conditions?
This issue deserves additional study, as the limited
research on small firms does not attempt to identify the
antecedents of marketing orientation. 
Marketing knowledge is based on the theory-building
research process that examines an issue from initial theo-
retical concept, through measurement design and testing,
to specific moderator and outcome examinations. To clari-
fy the existing contribution of marketing orientation
research through these stages, the following classification
is useful: 
• Initial conceptual development: Studies in this
stage examine theoretical/conceptual issues
and the development of various research frame-
works (e.g., Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver
and Slater 1990; Slater and Narver 1995).
• Measurement development: Translation of the
concept into empirically testable measurement
tools and validation (Morris and Paul 1987;
Miles and Arnold 1991; Kohli, Jaworski, and
Kumar 1993).
• Concept testing: These studies include exami-
nation of—
—antecedents of marketing orientation (Jaworski
and Kohli 1993; Atuahene-Gima 1996; Pelham
and Wilson 1996; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997;
Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998; Harris 1999;
Voss and Voss 2000 ); 
—performance outcomes of marketing orientation
(Narver and Slater 1990; Jaworski and Kohli
1993; Slater and Narver 1994; Atuahene-Gima
1996; Pelham and Wilson 1996; Gatignon and
Xuereb 1997; Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998;
Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Voss and Voss 2000);
—moderators of the marketing orientation-per-
formance relationship (Jaworski and Kohli 1993;
Slater and Narver 1994; Atuahene-Gima 1996;
Pelham and Wilson 1996; Becherer and Maurer
1997; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Han, Kim,
and Srivastava 1998); and
—the impact of marketing orientation and various
marketing practices in alternative organizations
such as small or mid-size firms (Pelham 1997,
2000; Horng and Chen 1998; Carson and
Gilmore 2000) and even nonprofit, artistic 
environments (Voss and Voss 2000).
This research process classification highlights the need
for additional studies examining the impact of marketing
orientation within the context of SMEs. As the internal envi-
ronmental and internal context of the SME has received
less research attention, this is an area that is particularly
important to examine. Since this study will focus on this
last stage in the research classification—marketing orien-
tation among small and mid-size firms—a review of the
limited literature in this area follows.
Marketing Orientation in SMEs
Research on marketing orientation has been concerned
primarily with large U.S. firms; relatively few studies have
been conducted that are specific to small and medium-
sized businesses. In an early study, Peterson (1989) found
that most small U.S. manufacturing businesses adopt
either a production orientation or, secondarily, a sales ori-
entation, rather than a marketing orientation. These find-
ings were later confirmed in a study of small exporting
firms conducted by Sriram and Sapienza (1991). Pelham
(2000) found a negative relationship between firm size and
marketing orientation. He noted that small firms that are
marketing-oriented could enjoy a potential sustainable
competitive advantage since they have simpler organiza-
tional structures, more flexibility and adaptability, and a
greater capacity for speed and innovation. Barrett and
Weinstein (1998) argue, however, that small firms have
limited resources and little margin for error. This would
indicate that SME’s marketing orientation levels may be
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affected. Thus, the existence or level of marketing orienta-
tion among SMEs should continue to be investigated.
Furthermore, the business performance of small/mid-sized
firms with various marketing orientation levels should be
examined. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothe-
ses:
Hypothesis 1: Marketing orientation levels do not vary
among SMEs across company characteristics such as
firm size, age, scope, or competitive advantage.
Hypothesis 2: Marketing orientation levels do not vary
among SMEs across business performance levels
such as change in sales or profits.
Of additional interest would be whether leader characteris-
tics such as CEO education or experience levels would
influence marketing orientation levels. For example, Horng
and Chen (1998) found that the marketing experience and
formal education of Taiwanese top managers significantly
affected marketing orientation levels of small manufactur-
ing concerns. Leadership style, however (which they 
classified as “people orientation”), had very mixed effects
on various components of marketing orientation. Barrett
and Weinstein (1998) argued that certain internal variables
such as entrepreneurship behavior and other internal influ-
ences may be more important influences than external
variables (such as industry characteristics or competitive
hostility) because internal variables are, ultimately, more
controllable than external variables. Thus, characteristics
of the SME and the SME leaders should be examined in
relation to marketing orientation. Therefore, the following
exploratory research hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 3: Marketing orientation levels among
SMEs will not vary across leader characteristics such
as CEO age, gender, or education.
Hypothesis 4: Marketing orientation levels among
SMEs will not vary across leader decision-making
style.
Hypothesis 5: Marketing orientation levels among
SMEs will not vary across the entrepreneurial experi-
ence of the leader.
Methodology
Sample and Data Collection
The data was collected by questionnaires mailed to 683
small business CEOs located in large mid-western metro-
politan areas. These respondents were drawn from a list of
firms that had previously participated in a university Small
Business Institute consulting program over a 12-year 
period. Many of these firms had grown and matured during
that time. To attempt to make the sample more compre-
hensive, over several years, additional start-up and small
businesses were added to the mailing list. 
The data collection procedure included an initial post-
card alerting the respondent to the study and two subse-
quent mailings of the questionnaire and return envelope.
There were 215 usable responses, for a response rate of
31 percent. Nonresponse bias was investigated by com-
paring the first 25 percent of the responses with the last 25
percent of the responses received. No significant differ-
ences were found for several demographic characteristics
such as the age of the firm or the number of the employ-
ees in the firm. A t-test was also used to compare the early
and late respondents for each of the research variables,
and this analysis revealed no significant differences. 
Of the respondent company CEO/presidents, 79 per-
cent was male, and 21 percent was female. The compa-
nies they headed had median sales of $3.5 million.
Founded an average of 15 years ago, these firms had a
median of 22 employees. The scope of operation of these
firms ranged from local to international, with sales of $10
million at the 75th percentile.
Measures
Marketing Orientation.  An 11-item scale consisting of
items originally developed by Morris and Paul (1987) and
adapted by Miles and Arnold (1991) was used to measure
marketing orientation. It has demonstrated very high 
internal consistency in prior research and exhibited a 
coefficient alpha of .77 in this study. The items in this scale
reflect such factors as the company president’s perspec-
tive on whether his or her firm “regularly performs market-
ing research” or “commonly uses customers as a source of
new ideas.” This measure is shown in Figure 1.
Since there has been limited study of marketing orien-
tation in SMEs, the authors selected aspects of the inter-
nal environment that intuitively should influence the extent
of marketing orientation in a small company. Additionally,
factors were identified that could be investigated via
responses provided by a small company president.
Company Characteristics. The five characteristics of
the organizations were measured by asking the company
presidents to classify their company into the appropriate
category for each of the five company characteristics:
number of full-time employees, perceived competitive
advantage, scope of the business, age of the company,
and company sales. The categories for each variable are
presented in Table 1.
Company Performance. The performance of the com-
pany relative to both profit and sales was measured by
asking the respondent company president what percent-
age change had occurred in sales and profit over the past
three years. Due to the wide variation (from very negative
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Please indicate to what extent these items best represent your company.
Very Much Like Very Much Unlike
My  Company My Company
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We have a marketing department
We employ marketing consultants
The top-level marketing employee is V.P. or higher
We have an 800-number for customer feedback
We regularly perform marketing research
In my company, marketing generates most new products
We commonly use customers as a source of new ideas
In my company, top management has a marketing background
We feel that marketing has a significant impact on the firm’s 
We have a new product development group
We have a marketing research group
*These items were mixed with other scale items on entrepreneurial orientation.
Figure 1. Marketing Orientation Scale Items*
Table 1
Analysis of Variance for Company Characteristics
Mean
Variable Marketing Orientation F-Ratio Significance
Number of Full-time 1 to 9 34.65
Employees 10 to 19 39.24 6.54 0.00
20 to 99 42.58
100+ 45.10









Scope of the Business local 32.76
state wide 40.52
regional( multi-state) 42.49 9.58 0.00
national 44.84
international 46.29
Age of Company 0 to 4 40.61
5 to 14 40.79 0.30 0.83
15 to 49 38.86
50+ 40.73
Company Sales $ 0-499 36.93
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to very positive), these responses were grouped into four
categories for both variables.
Company President Characteristics. The respon-
dent company presidents were asked to indicate their gen-
der and the appropriate category for their age and educa-
tion. 
Decision-Making Style. Respondents were asked
whether they make, share, or do not make decisions on
both day-to-day and long-term issues. Daily issues were
characterized as such things as issuing credit or purchas-
ing, and long-term decisions were described as strategic
areas like expansion or major new financial commitments.
Entrepreneurial Experience. The entrepreneurial
experience of the company president was assessed in two
ways. The CEO respondents were asked to indicate their
ownership status in the company. The choices were:  just
manage the company, started the company, purchased the
company, inherited the company, or “other” as ownership
status. “Other” may include presidents who have stock
options or other “earn in” provisions. As a second variable,
each respondent was asked how many businesses he or
she had started.
Results
To examine the influence of organizational characteristics
on the marketing orientation of SMEs, ANOVA was used to
analyze five different internal organizational characteristics
as independent variables, with marketing orientation as
the dependent variable. These results are presented in
Table 1. As is indicated in the results, three significant dif-
ferences were identified in these five company character-
istic variables.
Marketing orientation was significantly different across
the size of the organization as measured by the number of
employees (p=.00). Interestingly, as the company size
increased (from small companies with 9 or fewer employ-
ees to those with 100 or more employees), the level of
marketing orientation increased. Significant differences
were found again when company size was measured by
sales level (p=.01). When comparing the smallest sales
volume companies with the largest, with only slight varia-
tion, the larger companies tended to exhibit more market-
ing orientation than the smaller companies.
While there were no significant differences in the mar-
keting orientation of companies based on their reported
competitive advantage focus (p=.42), the pattern of results
is suggestive. A differentiation strategy appears to be
associated somewhat with higher levels of marketing ori-
entation as compared to a more price focused strategy.
Scope of the business did produce significant differences
(p=.00). Companies that were local showed the least
amount of marketing orientation, and as the scope of the
company operations got broader (i.e., state, regional,
national, and international), the marketing orientation at
each level increased (p=.00). The number of years in oper-
ation was not a significant characteristic, however (p=.83).
The analyses presented in Table 1 provide some evi-
dence that there is a difference in marketing orientation
over different company characteristics. Hence, H1 is
rejected, indicating that an increase in a company’s mar-
keting orientation can be anticipated as the size or scope
of their operations increase. 
The performance of a company and its marketing orien-
tation are investigated in Table 2. Potential differences in
marketing orientation relative to the change in profit and
change in sales over the preceding three-year period were
examined. The analysis of variance for change in sales
was significant. Companies with more favorable changes
in sales demonstrated more marketing orientation than
firms with less satisfactory sales performance over the
preceding three years (p=.02). 
Although the ANOVA examining the change in profits
was marginally significant (p=.10), the marketing orienta-
tion/performance relationship was not completely clear.
While in general, firms with a more favorable change in
profits exhibited more marketing orientation, there was a
slight dip in marketing orientation comparing firms with
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance for Company Performance
Mean
% Change Marketing Orientation F-Ratio Significance
Company Change in Profits -100 to -1 37.81
Over the Past 3 Years 0 36.08
1 to 24 39.37 1.97 0.10
100+ 44.58
Company Change in Sales -100 to -1 31.82
Over the Past 3 Years 0 37.70
1 to 24 39.90 3.16 0.02
25 to 99 42.45
100+ 42.83
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static profit performance over the past three years. Based
upon the overall results, however, H2 is rejected; this 
suggests that higher performing companies tend to have
higher amounts of marketing orientation. 
Regarding H3, the hypothesis dealing with the market-
ing orientation of the company relative to the personal
characteristics of the leader, the analysis is presented in
Table 3. The personal characteristic variables that were
investigated include the gender, education, and age of the
company president. Only education was significant in the
analyses of variance that were conducted (p=.04). The
data indicated that presidents with less education led com-
panies with significantly less marketing orientation. Since
only one of the three analyses was significant, there is
insufficient evidence to fully reject H3.
Interestingly, while the pattern of the data regarding the
marketing orientation of the company and the decision-
making style of the leader is the same for both day-to-day
decisions and long-term decisions, only for day-to-day
decision-making was the relationship significant (p=.02;
see Table 4). In both decision-making styles, the lowest
marketing orientation was found in companies where lead-
ers make all the day-to-day and long-term decisions. This
was followed by more marketing orientation when they
shared these decisions, and even more when they are 
not involved in these decisions at all. The differences,
however, were not significant for the long-term decisions
(p=.44), suggesting that H4 can be rejected only tentative-
ly. The somewhat indeterminate results of both H3 and H4
suggest that further research on these variables is 
needed.
For the fifth hypothesis involving the marketing orienta-
tion of the company and the entrepreneurial experience of
the company leader, the data is presented in Table 5. Two
measures of entrepreneurial experience were utilized, and
both were significant.
While it is clear from the data in Table 5 that the market-
ing orientation of a company varies depending on the
entrepreneurial experience of the leader, the results also
suggest some unanticipated but interesting findings.
Managers (i.e., with no ownership) and those who inherit-
ed their ownership demonstrated the lowest levels of mar-
keting orientation. In contrast, the highest level of market-
ing orientation was associated with company presidents
with stock options and “buying-in” ownership potential.
Falling in the middle with respect to marketing orientation
were those who started or purchased the business. The
fact that the highest level of marketing orientation was
associated with more sophisticated ownership mecha-
nisms such as stock options may provide some insights
into these results. This group may include a more experi-
enced set of company leaders. The lower levels of market-
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Company President Characteristics
Mean
% Change Marketing Orientation F-Ratio Significance
Gender of male 37.81 1.23 0.27
Company President female 37.94
Education of Company HS 30.91
President College all or some 40.01 3.29 0.04
Post college 41.66
Age of Company President 20-35 36.36
36-44 40.75




Analysis of Variance for Company President Decision-making Style
Mean
% Change Marketing Orientation F-Ratio Significance
Day-to-Day make 36.96
Decisions share 42.07 4.25 0.02
do not make 43.43
Long-term make 39.03
Decisions share 41.14 0.84 0.44
do not make 46.00
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ing orientation for those who had initiated or purchased
their firms may reflect a less experienced leader group.
Similarly, the ANOVA for marketing orientation and the
number of prior businesses that the leader has started is
also significant. While company presidents who had expe-
rience with multiple previous start-ups demonstrated high-
er levels of marketing orientation, no clear pattern was
seen in the past entrepreneurship experience/marketing
orientation relationship. For example, firm leaders with
between two and three previous start-ups had higher lev-
els of marketing orientation than those who had initiated
four or more businesses. 
This second category of entrepreneurial experience is
based on the number of start-ups, however, not the num-
ber of sustained ventures the leader has been involved
with. It is possible that an “idea generator” type of founder
is prevalent in the group that reported four or more previ-
ous launches. Marketing orientation may be most critical in
sustaining a venture. These founders may be more
involved in the start-up phase than in sustaining the enter-
prise. This may account for this group’s lower level of 
marketing orientation, even with greater apparent entre-
preneurial experience. Based on the analysis, however,
H5 can be rejected.
Discussion and Implications
Better insights into the influences that organizational and
leader characteristics have on marketing orientation can
lead to more effective marketing practices. For small to
medium-sized enterprises, these factors have been less
frequently examined. This study was an effort to make
such an analysis, and several patterns emerged.
Theoretical Implications
Previous studies (Slater and Narver 1995; Harris 1999, for
example) suggest that the internal characteristics of 
an organization can play a determining role in implement-
ing an organization-wide marketing orientation. This
study’s overall findings support that perspective in SMEs.
Certain key organizational and leader characteristics were
associated with significant differences in the marketing 
orientation of the firms in the study.
The pattern of differences suggested by the findings is
also intriguing. On the surface, the findings may suggest
that marketing orientation is not stronger in smaller firms.
Size of the organization may not be, however, the actual
reason for the differences observed. Rather, marketing 
orientation involves not only the willingness of the firm to
gather and disseminate marketing intelligence, but also an
organizational culture that is committed to shaping 
customer value based on marketing intelligence. Both
awareness of the contribution marketing intelligence can
provide in adding customer value and the resources to put
marketing intelligence into effect are necessary. The abili-
ty to create and sustain the needed organizational culture
and resource infrastructure may be more difficult in 
smaller firms.
The pattern of differences in marketing orientation asso-
ciated with day-to-day decision-making may also be con-
sidered in this context. As the company leader retained
operational decision-making on a day-to-day basis, lower
levels of marketing orientation were evidenced. In a larger
organization it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the
firm president to retain this type of hands-on involvement.
In contrast, such involvement might be prevalent in many
smaller firms.
While smaller size would appear to offer an advantage
in creating a firm-wide responsiveness, fostering such a
marketing-oriented culture becomes much more depend-
ent on a single individual: the company president. If the
firm’s leader is unwilling or unable to relinquish day-to-day
decision-making, the organization’s culture may also not
support the values needed for high levels of marketing ori-
entation. Though more immediately apparent in smaller
organizations, top management support for a firm-wide
culture that fosters a marketing orientation is critical at any
size.
Managerial Implications
One managerial implication for SMEs involves the type
and level of involvement of the CEO on the day-to-day
operations of the small business. Clearly, small business
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance Entrepreneurial Experience of Company President
Mean
% Change Marketing Orientation F-Ratio Significance
Ownership Status of started 39.61
Company President purchased 41.49
inherited 37.80 2.64 0.04
other own 56.60
manager 38.32
Number of Businesses 0 bus. started 38.81
Started by Company 1 bus. started 36.17
President 2-3 bus. Started 44.98 5.24 0.00
4+ bus. Started 42.20
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leaders must learn to delegate day-to-day decision-making
once a company grows beyond the start-up and growth
phases. The danger of lower levels of marketing 
orientation being exhibited throughout a firm could be
enhanced if CEOs are focused too much on operational
issues. 
The research findings also suggest that CEO education
plays a role in the marketing orientation of SMEs since
higher marketing orientation levels were associated with
higher levels of CEO education. Small firm leaders,
regardless of job pressures or time constraints, should
consider continuing executive education programs not
only for personal career fulfillment, but also as a logical
approach to improving firm performance. The impact of
additional education could be especially advantageous if it
allows small firm leaders to combat many typical problems
associated with SMEs—leadership dependent on the
CEO, obsession with growth at all costs, administrative
inefficiencies, and poor organizational structure (e.g.,
Brereton 1974; Lowry and Chapman 2000). In addition,
since problems in sales/marketing recently ranked as the
number one business problem of small and mid-sized
businesses (Lowry and Chapman 2000), greater executive
education in this area, including understanding the 
benefits of and implementation necessary for marketing
orientation, could help small companies.
Additionally, this research indicates that marketing 
orientation is related to both the size and scope of a com-
pany’s operations. As small and mid-sized firms evolve
from start-up ventures and move into the growth, maturity,
and rebirth/decline stages, CEOs must begin to place
greater emphasis on infusing the SME with his or her inno-
vative behaviors. This includes evolving from traditional
marketing companies to “entrepreneurial marketing”
organizations (Schindehutte, Morris, and Kuratko 2000).
Often referred to as corporate entrepreneurship (Morris
and Kuratko 2000), intrapreneurship (Pinchot and Pellman
1999), or corporate venturing (Block and MacMillan 1993),
this process of organizational change and renewal relies
heavily on a company-wide marketing orientation and
activities. For example, the creation of customer value
through continuous innovation or leading the company into
new markets, products, or technologies will be critical 
factors for future SME business performance.
Future Research
The cross-sectional design of this study does not, of course,
allow causal inferences. Future longitudinal studies would
provide a better understanding of the nature of these rela-
tionships. While appropriate to the design, future research
might also combine internal self-report measures with other
internal and external measures. Such a range of measures
would enhance the generalizability of the findings.
Several directions for future research are, however,
suggested by these findings. This study examined the
potential differences in marketing orientation across inter-
nal organizational and leader characteristics in SMEs.
Further investigation into the role the organizational leader
plays in fostering a firm’s marketing orientation could yield
valuable insights. For example, the current research must
eventually be extended to measure marketing orientation
levels of SMEs throughout all stages of the business life
cycle, not just at a single point in time. How much (if at all)
do marketing orientation levels change over the life of the
SME? And how might these changes be impacted, posi-
tively or negatively, by other internal characteristics?  
Previous research found that a differentiation strategy
was associated with higher levels of marketing orientation
(Pelham 1997; Homburg, Workman and Krohmer 1999, for
example). Although not significant in this study, further
examination is needed to determine whether a niche strat-
egy is associated with higher levels of marketing orienta-
tion. Since niche/differentiation strategies are often
employed by smaller entrepreneurial firms, this has partic-
ular relevance for SMEs.
The performance variables used in this study suggest-
ed a positive impact on SMEs exhibiting stronger levels of
marketing orientation. However, since firms experience 
differing sales cycles, the time frame between implement-
ing marketing orientation and resultant outcomes may also
differ. Incorporating this characteristic into future studies
could further clarify the impact of marketing orientation on
SME performance.
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The interest for collaboration among small and medium-
sized enterprises and innovation has been highlighted, in
recent times, due to the acceleration of technological
changes and to increasing international competitiveness.
Many small firms, with rigid structures and weak entrepre-
neurial dynamics, experienced difficulties in becoming
innovators. Some of these firms can adopt collaborative
agreements because these relationships enable them to
get the necessary innovative activities, know-how, and
exploit opportunities, which they cannot achieve alone.
This study examines the motives for the formation of
collaborative agreements in industrial Portuguese SMEs
and presents some empirical evidence concerning collab-
oration as an important vehicle for the innovativeness of
these small firms. The findings were based on a sample of
92 firms/collaborative agreements.
F aced with global economic competitiveness, theneed for collaboration among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), completed with innova-
tion has become a subject of prime importance to govern-
ments, industry, and academics. Firms are reminded con-
stantly that collaboration strategy (Jarillo 1990) and inno-
vation (Chaharbaghi and Newman 1996) lie at the heart of
competitive performance. Collaboration and innovation
have been widely regarded as an important change
process that can sustain business development in increas-
ingly dynamic markets. In recent years, a large amount of
literature has emerged on collaboration strategy (Franco
1995, 2001; Glaister and Buckley 1996; Volery 1996) and
innovation (Pettitt 1990), but very little basic research has
been conducted by industry recognizing that these two
instruments can be related and they can contribute to
international competitiveness. However, a recent study
(Kaufman et al. 2000) explored the relationships among
collaboration, technology, and innovation in SMEs manu-
facturers.
In fact, in a globally competitive marketplace, collabora-
tion and innovation—new technologies, new skills, and
new systems—are transforming the goals and practice of
economic development. For Birchall et al. (1996), compet-
itive pressures and market globalization have provided the
inputs for innovation (i.e., creation, development, and
introduction) of new product/services or a new procedure
or process for business to benefit one or more of the
stakeholders in an organization. 
In this sense, González et al. (1997) argue that because
firms must adapt themselves to a changing external envi-
ronment, they need an aggressive innovation policy in
order to convert innovation into competitive advantage.
This circumstance has obliged firms to introduce innova-
tion into their strategic plans, so they can attain the neces-
sary competitiveness to operate in the current environ-
ment. To innovate there has to be a determination to
achieve some results. Such a determination will then
transform itself through creativity into a vision of the future
where opportunities can be realized. The exploitation of
these opportunities requires certain models and tools, the
application of which will refocus the organization on new
ways of working (Chaharbaghi and Newman 1996).
Due to their limited financial and human resources,
some SMEs need to develop collaborative agreements
with other firms, public institutions, and large corporations.
Collaboration among SMEs can be a good strategy to
overcome some of these constraints and to reinforce and
improve the level of their innovation. As stressed by
Celeste (1996), beginning in the 1980s, collaboration
helped revitalize key industries. Now, a new generation of
collaborative agreements is beginning, ones formed to
focus on technology innovation. These relationships
include university agreements, research institute agree-
ments, collaborative research and development (R&D)
agreements, inward technology licensing, and, in certain
instances, R&D limited partnerships.
Collaboration encourages firms to maintain continual
innovation and quality improvement needed to compete
globally, and to strengthen market position. Industrial col-
laboration is almost unanimously considered vital to a
firm’s survival. Hausler et al. (1994) state that collaborative
agreements are perceived as a major source of a nation’s
competitive strength and, according to Harrison (1997),
firms have been encouraged to innovate so as to increase
their competitiveness.
In this context, the theoretical framework of this study is
to explore the developing literature about motives for col-
laboration formation and to analyse firms’ innovative
behavior, as well as to present some empirical evidence
about these last two issues. 
In this research, innovations are considered as a set of
activities limited in space and time, and include new prod-
ucts, new processes, new organizational technologies, or
new social methods.
Collaboration among SMEs as a Mechanism for Innovation:
An Empirical Study
Mário José Batista Franco
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Theoretical Framework
Collaboration among Firms for the 
Rapid Exploitation of Innovation
Collaboration among firms has become a focal issue in the
debate on industrial innovation. The ascent of collabora-
tive agreements as a central topic in the literature on inno-
vation has been accompanied by proposals for a redefini-
tion of concept of innovation (Hausler et al.. 1994; Dutta
and Weiss 1997). Evidence supporting an increasing need
for collaborative agreements in industrial innovation
processes has been provided by an increasing number of
studies. According to Hausler et al. (1994), numerous
empirical studies have revealed firms’ motivations for par-
ticipating in collaborative agreements.
In an economic environment where innovation tends to
be increasingly costly and where the timing of market entry
appears to be increasingly critical for the commercial suc-
cess of innovations, collaboration strategy is seen as the
most promising way to reduce the risks and costs associ-
ated with industrial R&D activities (Hausler et al. 1994). As
stressed by Kotabe and Swan (1995), global and increas-
ingly key organizational forms are being created through
collaborative agreements.
According to Rosenberg (1991) and Tushman (1977),
new models must be able to incorporate notions such as
feedback between scientific research, technical develop-
ment, and production. In organizational terms, such “inter-
active” or “circular” models of innovation presume an insti-
tutional structure of innovation that is extremely variegated
and involves a complex network of backward, forward,
horizontal, and lateral relationships and linkages within
and among firms and organizations such as universities
(Hausler et al. 1994).
According to Celeste (1996), collaborative agreements
formed to share the costs and benefits of new technology
and operating methods, serve as important new tools for
economic development. Technology and innovation are
often the key drivers in the formation of business partner-
ships and collaboration, reflecting the parallel relationship
between the institutional and the technological areas
(Arias 1995).
As changes in an environment create possibilities for
future innovations, Forrest (1990) states that collaborative
agreements allow small firms to innovate in a timely man-
ner, for often there is an optimal time to develop a new
product.
Several authors have provided reasons for collabora-
tion formation. An explanation for use of collaborative
agreements stems from theories on how strategic behav-
ior influences the competitive positioning of the firm (Kogut
1988). Harrigan (1985), Mariti and Smiley (1983), Porter
and Fuller (1986), Contractor and Lorange (1988), and
Glaister and Buckley (1996) explicitly consider a number
of the motives for collaboration formation. Collaboration
has a competitive use in that it could consolidate a firm’s
existing market position. Collaborative agreements also
allow firms to diversify into attractive but unfamiliar busi-
ness areas, thereby providing a less risky means of enter-
ing new markets.
The theoretical frameworks for the explanation of col-
laboration processes do not map neatly on to motives.
According to Glaister and Buckley (1996), the mainstream
economics approach treats the extension of the firm by
collaborative agreements as a means to obtain economies
of scale. Transaction cost explanations emphasize the use
of collaboration as a means of reducing costs and the
reduction of risks. Motives of organizational theory involve
a transfer of technology and the suggestion from this body
of theory is that international expansion is facilitated by
cooperation. Collaboration among SMEs provides benefits
from the exploitation of innovative activities, technology, or
other skills transfer (Harrigan 1985). Contractor and
Lorange (1988) and Forrest (1990) point out that, in gen-
eral, collaborative agreements can be used to bring
together complementary skills and talents which cover dif-
ferent aspects of the know-how needed in technology
industries. As noted by Glaister and Buckley (1996), signif-
icant innovation is likely to result from the fusing of these
complementary skills, a result which is unlikely to be
achieved by one firm acting alone. 
Although many small firms will opt for growth through
collaboration, the choice of agreement is important.
Effective linkages can occur throughout the innovation
chain. These linkages help the firms overcome their weak-
nesses and build on their strengths. The choice of alliance
must depend on the focus of the firm’s overall growth strat-
egy (Forrest 1990). For example, collaborations such as
R&D agreements, marketing/distribution agreements, out-
ward technology licensing, or joint ventures are valid
choices, but may not fit every company’s business plan. 
Based on collaboration strategy, small firms would be
wise to choose those relationships which help to strength-
en their core technologies, and develop others which
assist in their market focus. According to Forrest (1990),
managers recognize that collaboration is a key factor in a
firm’s competitiveness and, therefore, a basic factor in
their generic strategies. A unilateral agreement is neces-
sary whereby the skills of one firm can complement those
of another. 
In conclusion, SMEs can use a variety of collaborative
agreements to develop and to sustain their technological
competitiveness, facilitate the rapid exploitation of their
innovation activities, and facilitate international expansion.
Entrepreneurial Innovation and Firm’s Size
For innovation to become the goal of firms, it must first be
understood. However, the concept of innovation has been
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defined in different ways. According to Chaharbaghi and
Newman (1996), the difficulty is that there is no common
perspective to link different studies. Innovation is viewed
differently, emphasising different components such as
marketing, technology, and organization.
For example, some researchers (Berry and Taggart
1994; Celeste 1996; Chaharbaghi and Newman 1996;
Hauschildt 1992; Harrison 1997) have used innovation to
describe the introduction and spread of new and improved
products and processes in the economy and “technologi-
cal innovation” to describe advances in knowledge. For
Hyvarinen (1992), innovation is an invention used on a
large scale to take economic advantage of it. One basic
invention may lead to several innovations.
Early definitions of an innovation were developed for
industrial purposes and they stressed the product and
process. Later, the concept was widened to cover different
innovations from everyday improvements to large organi-
zational renewals based on different technologies. 
According to most studies (Birchall et al. 1996; Harrison
and Watson 1998; Hyvarien 1992; Lara 1990), the contri-
bution of small firms to research and innovation has grown
regularly and seems to be slightly higher than that of very
large corporations, mainly because SMEs have shorter
development cycles and are closer to the market. In fact,
only very recently have researchers and managers sug-
gested that small firms are able to manage their technolog-
ical knowledge and their know-how in a more systematic
way than larger companies. 
There is a continuous discussion about the association
between size and innovative capacity. Some researchers
argue that bigger firms’ dynamism is greater in this field.
However, other authors assert that SME possesses appro-
priate characteristics for innovative activities (González et
al. 1997).
The size-innovation relationship debate is well known.
Traditionally, two opposing positions existed. On one
hand, are those who, following the arguments of
Schumpeter (1942), considered that large firms were more
innovative. On the other hand, there were those who main-
tained that small firms were more open to the introduction
of organizational changes. The flexibility of the SMEs, their
simple organizational structure, low risk, and receptivity to
changes, would be, according to González et al. (1997),
essential features for enabling SMEs to be innovative,
both within the organization and in the external market.
Recent studies have paid more attention to the contri-
bution that small firms could make in the innovation field.
According to Jones-Evans et al. (1996), studies show that
technologically innovative SMEs in the United Kingdom
have above-average growth rates with regard to assets
and exports. Moreover, such companies tend to have low
bankruptcy rates.
Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the
relationship between size and innovative capability, but
without definitive conclusions. There is evident ambiguity
regarding the role that the variable of size assumes with
regard to the collaborative agreements and to the capabil-
ity of firms to generate innovation. With a steady number
of products, a large organization, a greater diversity of
capabilities, better marketing channels, and economies of
scale, larger firms are more innovative (Baldwing and
Scott 1987). On the other hand, small firms have to be
even more highly innovative to attract more attention and
overcome their competitors’ advantages in order to attract
their customers, as suggested by Utterback and Abernathy
(1975) and Kotabe and Swan (1995). These smaller, less
integrated, and undefended firms with new technological
innovations collaborate with established firms to gain
access to the latter’s complementary assets of reputation
and distribution channels, customer bases, and possible
acceptance as dominant design in subcategory markets. 
It is wholly conceivable that the introduction of success-
ful products by larger firms can be attributed to innovations
created by SMEs. Large firms are in a more favorable
position to learn and to imitate the production and distribu-
tion advantages of small firms (Miles and Snow 1978). 
Finally, it is important to note that a firm’s size, in itself,
is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage. But each
dimensional step involves a set of specific characteristics
that, depending on the objective (innovative behavior), can
represent benefits or obstacles. 
Objective, Hypotheses, and Methodology
Research Objective 
SMEs represent the major part of the Portuguese industri-
al sector. About 76.5 percent of firms have fewer than 10
employees and less than 0.2 percent have more than 500.
Some of these small firms are concentrated in traditional
activities such as textiles and clothing manufacture. These
SMEs are mainly labor intensive and tend not to diversify
their products or markets.
In this sense, competitiveness depends on a firm’s inno-
vative capability and cooperation strategy. Therefore, this
research identifies the main motives for collaboration for-
mation and explores the relationship between a firm’s size
and innovative behavior in industrial Portuguese SMEs.
Hypotheses
Research concerning the motives to engage in collabo-
rative agreements has examined the development
process from a variety of different theoretical perspectives.
According to Frankel and Whipple (1996) motives are
important because they represent the participating firms’
goals for the collaboration. As such, motives may form the
basis for evaluating potential and actual attainment.
Different motives imply different goals. 
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Understanding the potential impact of those differences
is only one of many factors that are important to the suc-
cessful creation, implementation, and maintenance of an
agreement. Research suggests that critical issue regard-
ing collaborative agreements concerns the recognition of
complementary motives. Such recognition requires careful
design, development, and use of interorganizational struc-
tures and procedures to achieve the cooperation goals
and objectives inherent in each firm’s motives.
Theoretical frameworks developed in collaboration field
suggest that the formation of collaborative agreements is
an innovative attempt by a firm to manage and control
uncertainty (Spekman and Kirti 1990). While such theoret-
ical frameworks broadly characterize the underlying ration-
al for a firm’s entry into a collaborative agreement, they
generally do not explicitly detail those motives.
In fact, the literature gives little indication a priori of what
to expect in terms of the relative importance of a set of
motivating factors for collaboration among firms’ formation.
Thus, this reasoning leads to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Since motives for collaboration are
often multidimensional, very complex and heteroge-
neous, it is possible to aggregate motives into several
factors (dimensions) for collaboration among SMEs
formation. 
Some theoretical and empirical studies (Jones-Evans et
al. 1996; González et al.1997; Riedle, quoted in Birchall et
al. 1996) propose that there are differences between
SMEs and large firms in their innovative behavior. Some of
these studies point out that small firms behave in a differ-
ent way than large ones. These previous studies conclude
that the innovative strategy implanted by both types of
firms is different and presuppose a homogeneous behav-
ior of the SME with respect to the innovation. However,
other studies (González et al. 1997; Hage and Aiken 1970;
Thompson 1967) suggest that several characteristics of
small firms make them more likely to introduce changes.
Thus, size can play a role in the diversity of a firm’s size, a
mixture of large and small firms, and has been supported
as most conducive to innovation. Finally, despite empirical
studies that have attempted to clarify this relationship
between size and innovation capability, they do not arrive
at definitive conclusions. 
The research does also not present explicitly this asso-
ciation, about firm size and the motives for collaboration
formation, which leads to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The relative importance of the motives
for collaboration formation will vary with the firm’s
size. The dimension (factor) associated with innova-
tive activities will also vary with this contingency 
variable.
Methodological Aspects
Sample and Data. In Portugal, there is no publicly avail-
able database about cooperative agreements because
most of them are implicit (tacit or informal). In order to
analyse the potential association between collaborative
agreements in Portuguese SMEs (firms with less than 250
employees) and their innovative behavior, data were col-
lected from a survey based on a database created in an
empirical study (Franco 2001). In this previous research, a
total of 627 questionnaires were administered in February
2000. After one reminder, 114 usable questionnaires were
returned, representing an 18.3 percent response rate. This
low response rate may be due to the fact that small firms
find it more of a problem to reply to mail questionnaires
than larger companies, especially when the subject is rel-
atively new, as in this study. Another potential argument is
that the managers in small firms would have only a limited
amount of time to devote to the questionnaire and limited
human resources. Note that, in this study, the data were
only collected from the 92 questionnaires corresponding to
SMEs.
To evaluate the main motives for collaboration forma-
tion, business owners were asked to respond to a set of
statements on a five-point Likert scale (i.e., 1 = “of no
importance” to 5 = “of major importance”).1 Prior research
indicated that ordinal classification of perception was a
more realistic task for respondents than use of interval or
ratio measures (Geringer 1991). It was also expected that
managers would have only a limited amount of time to
devote to the questionnaire, hence an easily understood
Likert scale appeared to be more feasible than a potential-
ly more precise but more complex scaling method. A five-
point scale was adopted because it was felt that more
numerous response categories would exceed the respon-
dent’s ability to discriminate, with the likelihood that “noise”
rather than more precise data would result. See Table 2 for
a complete list of collaborative motives.
Statistical Analysis. Based on statistical tools (frequency
analysis, factor analysis, as well as multivariate analysis)
and using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences
(SPSS), the data collected were analyzed to provide an
overview of collaboration and innovation variables. First,
an approximation to the behavioral understanding of the
collaboration and innovative firms was made from frequen-
cies’ analysis of the variables included in the survey.
Second, results were obtained from a factor analysis of
variables indicating the main motives perceived by the
SMEs regarding collaboration. Finally, a one-way ANOVA
(statistic F) was performed to identify some association
between a firm’s size and innovative motives.
Table 1 summarizes the methodological aspects and
others used to validate the cooperation and innovation
behavior in Portuguese firms.
26 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
28




The sample is composed of 92 SMEs2 and presented
some diversity with respect to size distribution. About 23
percent of the firms were medium-size and only six firms
were micro-size (less than 10 employees). In the indus-
trial sector, machines and equipment (20.4% of the total),
textile and clothing industry (10.4%) were more represen-
tative. The localization of these firms was distributed in
the following main areas: Aveiro (20.4%), Lisbon
(19.4%), and Leiria (15.1%). Regarding their juridical
form, S Corporation3 was more representative (52 firms).
Firms were an average of 26 years old, ranging between
1 and 119 years, and many of the SMEs (57.8%) were
family businesses. 
Main Motives for Collaboration Formation
To determine the main firms’ motivations for participating
in collaborative agreements, firms were asked to value a
set of variables (motives), which were later submitted to
factor analysis. 
The motivations for collaborative agreements, which
are based on the mean measure of the importance of the
motives, are shown in Table 2. For the full set of agree-
ments, the mean is higher for the following motives:
“entering new markets,” “to improve the level of innova-
tion,” and “to share resources and competencies.” 
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Table 1
Methodological Aspects Used 
in the Empirical Research
Fieldwork time Cross-section  
Geographic focus Portugal
Industrial coverage Manufacturing sector
Firm’s size Small, medium, and large firms
Units of analysis Firm and agreements
Sampling design Convenience
Initial sample size 114/627 (Response rate: 18.3%)
Final sample size 92 SMEs/agreements
Data collection Mail survey (questionnaire)
Date of research field January to April 2000
Key informant Top management (general)/manager
Analysis Statistical (univariate and multivariate)
Table 2
Motivation for Collaborative Agreement Formation:
Motives Ranked by Mean Measure of Importance
Survey Item/Motivation Mean Standard Number of
Deviation Firms
Entering  new markets 3.761 1.152 92
To improve the level of innovation 3.685 1.037 92
To share resources and competencies 3.663 1.041 92
To create  economies of scale 3.533 1.032 92
To increase production capacity 3.478 1.172 92
To improve the quality 3.391 1.89 92
Facilitate international expansion 3.337 1.102 92
To achieve some experience 3.337 1.030 92
Technology transfer 3.185 1.204 92
Risk sharing 3.174 1.115 92
Faster payback on investment 3.098 1.028 92
To foment learning process 3.065 0.912 92
To improve the lead times 2.902 1.112 92
To share superiors and techniques staffs 2.696 0.958 92
To obtain financing 2.641 1.033 92
Note: The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (“of no importance”) to 5 (“of major importance”)
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Other relatively highly ranked motives are “to create
economies of scale” and “to increase production capacity.”
As shown in Table 2, the highest ranked motives are con-
cerned with competitive positions in either new or existing
markets, as well as in innovative activities.
As noted earlier, the 15 motives represent a number of
overlapping perspectives. From the analysis factorial tech-
nique, five factors (dimensions) were produced which
make good conceptual sense and explained 70.36 percent
of the observed variance, as shown in Table 3. For each
factor obtained from the factor analysis, a reliability analy-
sis was also performed (Croncach’s Alpha) to measure the
internal consistency of each scale as a whole. Such an
index, which varies between 0 and 1, measures the con-
sistency among variables and those they are expected to
measure. According to Malhotra (1993) and Hair et al.
(1998), the closer the index is from 1, the better is the
scale’s internal consistency. Results obtained are dis-
played in the last column of Table 3. In general, we can
observe that all the indexes are higher than 0.64, but not
very close to 1. According to the variables within each
group, five factors were classified (see Table 3). The
remainder of this section discusses the interpretation of
each of these factors.
Innovation and Organizational Learning (Factor 1).
This factor (dimension) includes motives associated with
the development of resources and competencies in tech-
nology and innovation areas, with benefits in terms of qual-
ity. “To achieve some experience” was another motive for
SMEs to collaborate. The experience is the main source of
interorganizational learning. This factor aggregates also
with the variable “to promote the learning process” as a
reason related with collaboration formation. In fact, the
motives that aggregate this first factor show the impor-
tance of activities’ coordination and a very close relation-
ship among firms. With this coordination and relationship
among firms, know-how and accumulate experience shar-
ing is easier.
Development and Market Power (Factor 2). This
includes two motives/variables: “entering new markets”
and “to facilitate international expansion.” International col-
laboration can also be the easiest way to penetrate foreign
markets. For SMEs, which lack international experience,
initial overseas expansion is often likely to be a collabora-
28 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Table 3
Principal Components Factor Analysis of Collaboration Motivations in Firms
Factors Factor Eigenvalue % Variance Cumulative Cronbach’s
Loads Explained Percent Alpha
F1: Innovation and Organizational Learning 3.453 23.023 23.023 0.839
To improve the level of innovation 0.810
To promote the learning process 0.782
Technology transfer 0.758
To share resources and competencies 0.730
To improve the quality 0.676
To achieve some experience 0.512
F2: Development and Market Power 1.955 13.032 36.055 0.755
Facilitate international expansion 0.863
Entering new markets 0.799
F3: Resource Dependence 1.866 12.437 38.492 0.687
To obtain financing 0.883
To share superiors and techniques staffs 0.652
Faster payback on investment 0.651
F4: Risks and Costs Sharing 1.644 10.962 59.454 0.666
To create  economies of scale 0.812
Risk sharing 0.785
F5: To Reinforce Production Capacity 1.636 10.907 70.361 0.640
To increase production capacity 0.881
To improve the lead times 0.696
Notes: KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.746
Bartlett Test of Sphericity: 510, 058;  df=105;  p <0.000
Fi (i=1,..., 5) – Factors (dimensions)
Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation
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tive agreement. Contractor and Lorange (1988) argue that,
in general, it is an expensive, difficult, and time-consuming
business to establish a global organization and a signifi-
cant international competitive presence. In fact, the move
to new foreign markets and the development of either a
multidomestic or global strategy can be facilitated by col-
laboration formation even for firms with considerable over-
seas experience.
Resource Dependence (Factor 3). When one firm col-
laborates, it can achieve resources not otherwise avail-
able. Small firms can have access to tangible resources
such as financing and investments. In fact, investment
sharing among several SMEs in cooperation projects can
reduce the costs. With collaboration among the firm’s
strategic thinking, the required financing can be lowered
through such collaboration. This entrepreneurial mecha-
nism allows access to different resources and capabilities
within the process. This dimension (factor) shows that to
enter into a collaborative agreement can be a risky option
compared with investing alone.
Risks and Costs Sharing (Factor 4). This factor
includes variables associated with a low uncertainty in the
current environment. For example, when high develop-
ment costs of new products exist, a collaboration agree-
ment can lessen the risk or at least help to minimize a 
possible failure. Another motive that includes this dimen-
sion is economies of scale. Despite economies of scale
sometimes increasing the risk, according to Sousa (1997),
it can constitute a way to reduce the risk by more efficient
cost structures. 
To Reinforce Production Capacity (Factor 5). This
factor includes two variables related to the production
area: (1) rationalization of material resources to increase
the production level, and (2) to achieve flexibility and 
specialization. For Roig (1989), the main objectives that
the firms achieve when they adopt collaborative agree-
ments are an economy of these resources and the reduc-
tion of excesses in production processes. Cooperation
allows a firm to concentrate on its resources and distinc-
tive competencies and to achieve other resources in 
speciality areas. 
To sum up, the findings show a high number of motives
that firms can associate with collaboration strategy.
However, factorial analysis allows us to conclude that the
SMEs are motivated by factors associated with (1) innova-
tion and organizational learning, (2) development and mar-
ket power, (3) resource dependence, (4) risks and costs
sharing, and (5) reinforce production capacity. So it should
be stressed that these findings give statistical support for
hypothesis 1.
COLLABORATION AMONG SMES AS A MECHANISM FOR INNOVATION 29
Table 4
Motivation for Collaborative Agreement Formation:
Firm’s Size
Factors/Dimensions Firm’s Size Statistic
Group Mean S. Deviation F
Factor 1: Less than 10 -0.092 1.087
Innovation and Organizational 11 - 50 -0.046 1.101 0.888 (n.s.)
Learning 51 - 250 0.048 1.001
Factor 2: Less than 10 0.341 1.074
Development and Market Power 11 - 50 -0.064 0.804
51 - 250 0.008 1.134 0.657 (n.s.)
Factor 3: Less than 10 -0.119 1.055
Resource Dependence 11 - 50 -0.104 1.061 0.557 (n.s.)
51 - 250 0.107 0.952 
Factor 4: Less than 10 0.496 0.233
Risks and Costs Sharing 11 - 50 -0.120 0.843 0.358 (n.s.)
51 - 250 -0.003 1.152
Factor 5: Less than 10 -0.258 0.735
To Reinforce Production Capacity 11 - 50 0.291 0.953 0.063  *
51 - 250 -0.198 1.023 
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean of the factor scores
* p< 0.10       n.s.: No significant
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Firm’s Size and Innovation Relationship 
As the five factors (dimensions) are not correlated with
each other, each of these motives can be pursued inde-
pendently. Thus, particular combinations of these factors
can underlie joint venture formation. To investigate further
the underlying nature of the motivation for this sample of
agreements, the analysis was developed by considering
the motives’ factors in terms of a firm’s size. For size vari-
able reports the means and standard deviations of the five
factors, the rank order of these dimensions (factors) and
the appropriate test statistic for comparing differences in
means (One-way ANOVA), is shown in Table 4.
The findings suggest that there is only significant differ-
ence (at the 0.10 level) in the means of the five factors. On
the basis of the findings it can be argued that, in terms of
percentage, firm size is not linked with motives for collab-
oration formation but rather with innovative activities. It
should be stressed however that these findings give weak
statistical support for hypothesis 2.
Conclusions
In an environment where competition has become severe,
where national boundaries have been broken down, 
and where technological leadership can be transitory, 
collaboration should be used as an important mechanism
for small firms to become innovators. Because of their
dynamic environment and the gaps between the various
links needed to complete the innovation process, firms
must, out of necessity, forge lateral “links” in the form of
collaborative agreements.
The innovation process for small firms can be simplified
and addressed in terms of the collaborative agreements.
The role of collaboration among SMEs, which has been
discussed, and how they relate to the completion of the
innovation process, has been an important mechanism for
firms to achieve a higher level of innovation. 
However, based on the findings obtained in this study,
we can conclude that there are several motives that firms
can adopt for collaborative agreements, including innova-
tion. On the basis of these findings, it can be argued that
small firms are linking up with other firms to pursue inno-
vative activities at lower cost and to gain from the techno-
logical know-how of the partner. However, the empirical
evidence does not confirm the size–collaboration–innova-
tion relationship. The statistical test used indicates that the
relative importance of the motivating factors do not vary
significantly with a firm’s size. So, this debate about a
firm’s size and collaboration and innovation behavior is still
open. Further investigation into these two features would
provide a deeper understanding of collaboration and inno-
vation linkages.
Finally, we suggest that entrepreneurs adopt collabora-
tion as an alternative strategy. It could be useful to put
together more and more of these small firms to improve
their level of innovation. From this study, it can be seen
that for SMEs to develop and sustain their technological
competitiveness and facilitate the rapid exploitation of their
innovativeness, they should use a variety of collaborative
agreements.
Endnotes
1. A “3” corresponds to “indifferent” and not “a mean importance.”
2. One collaborative agreement was considered in each firm.
3. “S” Corporation is different from corporations due to the limited capital permitted by law (5.000 € contrasted to 
50.000 €) and the minimum number of partners (two versus five).
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This study examines the results of a program intended to
act as a selection tool for mass merchandisers and a
development tool for small manufacturers. The evaluation
program assessed the management practices and prod-
ucts of potential suppliers. Based on past experience, buy-
ers for mass merchandisers consider small manufacturing
enterprises a poor risk as potential suppliers of retail
goods. As part of the evaluation process, firms were asked
34 closed-end questions regarding their management
practices, and each product was evaluated on 41 specific
qualities necessary for the mass merchandising market.
Of the 1,690 firms that participated in this project, about 5
percent had their products accepted by a national mass
merchandiser. A review of the evaluation data reveals that
firms needed high performance in both areas of evaluation
to be successful in the marketplace, not just a strong firm
or a marketable product. However, each of these areas
separately had a statistically significant effect on the suc-
cess of the product in gaining a retail buyer’s attention.
Much of the research done on small firm survivalfocuses on the specific factors which seem topredict the early demise of the venture. Begley
and Boyd (1986) indicated that this research misses the
viability of the mature firm and the factors which, long-
term, predict its health in the marketplace. Lussier (1995)
found that the factors that are cited are too narrowly
focused, lacking a comprehensive framework for examina-
tion, echoing the results of an earlier study by Gaskill, Van
Auken, and Manning (1993). Corman and Lussier (1991)
also found that quite often the factors cited as failure rea-
sons or causes are better defined as symptoms.
From a purchasing standpoint, the buyer–supplier rela-
tionship often uses similar litmus tests in establishing long-
term business partnerships between firms. Research
examining this area often looks at either screening factors
or supplier development procedures for the purchasing
function. Park and Krishnan (2001) and others have stud-
ied various models of the purchasing relationship, but to
date this research has not fully examined the small firm
purchasing function. They did find that the function is a
strategic competency issue for buying firms. Pearson and
Ellram (1995) listed selection and evaluation factors, but
the development side of the partnership is left untouched.
Dollinger, Enz, and Daily (1991) suggest that minority firms
can profit from a greater understanding of how both sides
of this partnership (evaluation and development) create a
strong and healthy relationship for both parties.
This study attempts to examine the results of a program
created for just such a purpose. The program had both an
evaluation function for the buyer and a development func-
tion for the potential supplier. While this program did not
restrict itself to minority firms, it used many of the features
called for by Dollinger et al. (1991). The program evaluat-
ed small manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) wishing to
enter the national mass merchandising market, but it also
focused on ways to develop these firms so that they would
be more attractive to large retailers in the future. After a
review of relevant research in this area, we will examine
this program and its results in greater detail. 
Literature Review
Much of the literature on the buyer–seller relationship has
focused on supplier selection and evaluation (Pearson and
Ellram 1995; Swift and Gruben 2000; Park and Krishnan
2001). Some researchers have also looked at supplier
development and the role it plays in building long-term pur-
chasing relationships. These relationships are important to
the financial health and long-term viability of the firms
involved because of the impact they have on each firm’s
balance sheet. Studies have shown that the purchasing
function alone can account for up to 60 percent of a firm’s
expenditures (Tully 1995). This review focuses on supplier
selection studies that identify important criteria and suppli-
er development articles that offer advice for improving the
performance level of potential vendors.
Supplier Selection Studies
Supplier selection is an important aspect of the purchasing
management function because choosing the right supplier
and developing a supportive relationship begin the produc-
tion process (Li, Fun, and Hung 1997). Careful supplier
selection has become more critical recently due to shifts in
supply chain management. Buyers are reducing their sup-
ply base, focusing on long-term cooperative relationships,
Supplier Selection and Development:
The Relationship between
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and involving suppliers in production design (Abegglen
and Stalk 1985; Emshweiller 1991). Buying organizations
have realized that goals of lower costs, higher quality, and
customer satisfaction are heavily influenced by supplier-
controlled product attributes such as price and reliability.
Therefore, they are dedicating more resources to building
relationships with suppliers that are positive for both sides
(Tully 1995).
The goal of supplier selection is to choose the best 
supplier, or the one who has the highest quality product
and service for the customer (Swift and Gruben 2000).
Prior research on supplier selection has identified many
criteria for determining the best supplier(s). Verma and
Pullman (1998) identified quality, delivery reliability, price,
and flexibility as critical selection factors for buyers.
Pearson and Ellram (1995) found that quality was the
number one factor for small and large electronic firms in
selecting suppliers, followed by cost, current technology,
and design capabilities. St. John and Heriot (1993) sug-
gested that potential suppliers distance themselves from
the competition by raising quality above the industry stan-
dards, offering unique products, and having excellent
design capabilities. 
Piercy and Cravens (1997) examined the selection 
criteria of product, price, service, and relationships to
determine what buyers rated as important and what sup-
pliers performed the best. The authors found that buyers
preferred quality products and trustworthy relationships
the most, and suppliers scored high on both of these
items. In general, buyers ranked supplier-related issues
such as trust, communication, and a positive attitude 
higher in importance than product-related issues such 
as packaging, warranties, and international brand 
recognition. Wilson’s (1994) research also suggested that
quality and service have increased in importance as sup-
plier selection criteria, while price and delivery have
decreased. 
Park and Krishnan (2001) looked at the supplier selec-
tion practices of small businesses and found that although
managers use objective criteria for supplier selection, their
decisions may be influenced by industry factors and per-
sonal characteristics. Li, Fun, and Hung (1997) suggested
that supplier selection should not be based on just price.
The value of the supplier should be measured by the firm’s
performance on multiple criteria which indicate the total
materials cost. 
Pearson and Ellram (1995) call for studies that examine
the measurement of each selection criteria and different
industry studies to determine the criteria value based on
the environment. Past selection criteria such as depend-
able quality, delivery reliability, and large volume produc-
tion capability represent minimum qualifications for suppli-
ers. Today, buyers are also looking for supportive, long-
term relationships with suppliers (St. John and Heriot
1993).
Supplier Development Studies
While supplier selection is an important, extensively
researched purchasing activity, the literature concerning
supplier development is sparse. Supplier development
involves feedback, where potential vendors learn about
their strengths and weaknesses in order to establish or
improve a cooperative relationship with a buyer.
Traditionally, supplier development has not been a strong
point of U.S. firms, but the benefits are evident. Whitman
(1996) compared the sourcing strategies of suppliers in
the United States and Japan and found that Japanese
automakers were much more concerned with maximum
efficiency in the supply chain than U.S. firms. The result of
this development focus by Japanese firms included lower
inventory levels and costs.
Supplier development is not separate from supplier
selection but is rather an extension of the purchasing
process. Chrysler Corporation recognizes how supplier
selection and development blend together. No longer are
Chrysler dealers evaluated on sales and service alone;
other components such as training and employee develop-
ment programs are gaining importance. Chrysler wants
proactive dealers who implement their own continuous
improvement programs in an effort to become high-quality
retailers (Jackson 1997).
Self-improvement is a large aspect of supplier develop-
ment. Donovan (1996) noted that most manufacturers
could use a radical change in their supply chain manage-
ment, and he offered 10 benchmark questions to deter-
mine areas that need improvement. All of the questions
relate to product quality, price, and order processing.
Donovan (1996) stated that firms who reengineer their
supply chain within a five-year period could increase their
market share and profitability. Flanagan (1994) also sug-
gested that firms should implement cost-reducing and
quality improvement initiatives and build supportive buyer
relationships to gain a competitive advantage and combat
the large buying power of mass merchandisers.
Supplier development is not possible without buyer
assistance. Some corporations have implemented pur-
chasing programs to develop new suppliers (Dollinger,
Enz, and Daily 1991). These minority development pro-
grams are meant to demonstrate social responsibility by
the buying organization and stimulate entrepreneurship in
the minority community. The transaction cost of a large
buyer/small seller relationship is often high; therefore,
Dollinger, Enz, and Daily (1991) suggested some actions
that the buying organization could take to increase the
selection and development of minority suppliers. First,
buyers should separate the evaluation and selection
aspects of the process. In other words, purchasing
employees should not be responsible for both assessing
supplier potential and contracting with selected suppliers.
Second, buyers should adopt multiple criteria for evaluat-
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ing the effectiveness of purchasing programs that benefit
special groups and the performance of their purchasing
employees. Finally, buyers should use an evaluation
process coupled with a feedback process. 
It is clear that both evaluation and development should
be important aspects of a supplier selection program.
However, the costs to firms, even large ones, can be pro-
hibitive. Additionally, many firms are not ready to take such
proactive steps, whether or not the company’s mission is
oriented toward active social responsibility. Often, larger
firms may find it simply easier and more efficient to rely on
other large firms with established reputations rather than
to experiment with smaller manufacturers who are as yet
unproven. This study reviews an independent, outside pro-
gram set up to evaluate small manufacturers as potential
suppliers to large mass merchandisers. The program also
took on a developmental role for the SMEs in that it used
the evaluation results to help these firms understand their
weaknesses so that they could begin self-improvement
processes to increase their chances of success in the
future. In the end, the choice to improve was left to the
SME, and the choice of suppliers was left to the retailer.
However, it is likely that both were armed with better infor-
mation after the process than they would have been with-
out it.
Program Overview
In an effort to help mass merchandisers select more small
manufacturing firms as vendors, a program was devel-
oped that focused on supplier selection and development.
This evaluation program assessed the products and man-
agement practices of SMEs that were interested in becom-
ing suppliers to major American mass merchandisers.
While the ultimate goal of the process was to determine
which ventures were best suited for the mass merchandis-
ing market, the program also served as an advising tool for
manufacturers by counseling them on their strengths and
weaknesses. The program consisted of two evaluations:
an assessment of the firm’s management practices and an
assessment of its submitted product. Each venture was
either forwarded or not forwarded to mass merchandiser
buyers for their consideration based upon the results of
these evaluations. The resulting decision to market the
product nationally was made by the merchandiser buyer. 
Firm Assessment
After contacting the program’s director, a venture’s owner
was asked to complete an objective self-assessment of his
or her firm’s management practices. Each owner was
advised that all responses would be independently verified
and that fraudulent representations would immediately 
disqualify their venture from further consideration in the
program. Firms were asked 34 closed-end questions
regarding their management practices. Each question had
five or six possible responses which were based on prior
research or observed practice, and they were ranked for
desirability by professional buyers prior to the program.
However, when the actual instrument was constructed, the
responses were scrambled to reduce respondent bias.
The minimum desirable level of compliance was set at the
median of the responses available. An example of an item
and its responses (listed in ascending order of desirability)
is given below:
Marketing Plan. Does your firm have a marketing 
plan for this project?
We do not need a marketing plan for this project.
We have an informal, unwritten marketing plan.
We have an informal, written plan.
A formal, written marketing plan is in progress.
We have a formal, written marketing plan.
The management practice items included on the firm
assessment instrument were selected and revised based
on generally accepted research conclusions and discus-
sion with potential buyers from the mass merchandiser
industry. The program director and his staff researched the
literature in this area to find what seemed to be the salient
qualities required for success as a small manufacturer.
They then approached scholars in each business disci-
pline and further developed the core areas. Finally, they
approached representatives of mass merchandising firms
to verify the qualities that these professionals deemed
appropriate for their firm’s suppliers. The final instrument
was created based on the management practices distilled
in this process, as suggested by previous studies (e.g.,
Pearson and Ellram 1995). The basic content areas of the
firm assessment instrument are presented in Figure 1.
Product Evaluation
The prospective supplier also had to provide the program
with a sample of the product in its final packaging.
Independent professional evaluators assessed this prod-
uct for its potential success in the major retail market. Each
product was evaluated on 41 specific qualities necessary
for the mass merchandising market. Evaluators then made
general assessments of the firm in five areas (production
capability, product quality control, marketing capability,
engineering and technical capability, and financial capabil-
ity) and overall assessments of the product and the firm.
As with the firm assessment, there were five or six possi-
ble responses for each item (along with the option to mark
an area as “not applicable”), but the responses were not
scrambled because bias was not expected from the
trained independent evaluators in this program. The mini-
mum desirable level of compliance was set at the median
of the responses available. An example of an item and its
responses is given below:
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Content Areas Management Practice
Marketing Management Creation and Use of a Marketing Plan
Marketing Organization Structure
Price Determination Process
Market Demand Determination Process
Competitive Product Analysis
Creation and Use of a Promotional Plan
Company Orientation (Customers, sales, profitability, etc.)
Strategic Direction Creation and Use of a Mission Statement
Creation and Use of Detailed Job Descriptions
Openness to Employee Input
Type and Quantity of Management Experience
Quality Assurance Process
Primary Objectives of Company (Return on investment, market share, etc.)
Use of Outside Consultants
Creation and Use of a Business Plan
Existence of a Board of Directors
Involvement of the Board of Directors
Technical Management Type and Quantity of Product Testing
Extent of Research and Development
Manufacturing Technology Upgrade Cycle
Production Management Creation and Use of a Management Planning and Control System
Delivery Schedule Reliability
Quality Control Measures (Including ISO 9000)
Creation and Use of a Maintenance Program Schedule
Creation and Use of a Cost Containment Program
Creation and Use of a First-Piece Approval System
Creation and Use of an In-Process Quality Inspection System
Creation and Use of a Continuous Improvement Program
Financial and Use of Cash Flow Analysis
Accounting Management Length of Budgetary Planning Cycle
Length of Budget Update Cycle
Use of Professionals for Cost Accounting Measures
Use of Professionals for Accounting Function Measures
Use of Professionals for Financial Planning Measures
Figure 1. Common Management Practices Used in This Study
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Functional Feasibility: In terms of its intended functions,
will it do what it is intended to do? This product:
Is not sound; cannot be made to work.
Won’t work now, but might be modified.
Will work, but major changes might be needed.
Will work, but minor changes might be needed.
Will work; no changes necessary.
As with the self-assessment instrument, the product
evaluation instrument was constructed using a combina-
tion of research and practical observation. The product
assessment format was essentially a modified version of
the seventh version of the Preliminary Innovation
Evaluation System (PIES) initially developed by the
National Science Foundation as part of the Innovation
Centers experiment at the University of Oregon in 1974.
Since that time, this structured evaluation format has been
used to evaluate more than 30,000 ideas, inventions, and
new products in the United States, Canada, and else-
where. The PIES format was noncorporate in its orienta-
tion and contained questions addressing societal, busi-
ness risk, demand, market acceptance, competitiveness,
and commercialization issues. For the most part, only
minor changes in wording were needed to shift the focus
from ideas and innovations to completed products pre-
pared for the marketplace. The specific areas are shown in
Figure 2.
Sample
All of the small manufacturing firms in this sample were
independently owned and were not dominant in their
industry. A review of the basic demographics of the sample
shows that 1,690 of 2,113 potential suppliers (80.0%) com-
pleted both the self-assessment and product evaluation
portions of the assessment process. Of these 1,690 firms,
321 (19.0%) were female-owned and managed, 1,330
(78.7%) were male-owned and managed, and 39 (2.3%)
were not identified by gender ownership or management.
Respondents were from all states, with no one region
dominating the sample. Racial, ethnic, and other minority
information were not kept as part of the main database. No
one manufacturing or retail area was predominant,
although all firms supplied products exclusively for con-
sumer purchase. Industrial products were not part of this
program. Products varied in suggested retail price from
inexpensive and/or point-of-purchase to major purchase
levels.
Methodology
The instruments used in this program were created follow-
ing the lead of earlier studies. These methods have since
been validated by further research which suggests that the
use of academics and practitioners to create items and
their responses is a valid technique. Swift and Gruben
(2000) suggest the use of previous instruments to gener-
ate items. Their study used acceptable techniques to mod-
ify and even eliminate items based on their usefulness for
the current study. Pearson and Ellram (1995) used select-
ed criteria from various studies to create a new instrument.
They then asked colleagues to review the instrument for
content validity and clarity and then distributed the edited
document to academics and practitioners for further
review. The resulting document was assumed to have con-
tent validity based on these procedures. Evans, Feldman,
and Foster (1990) used a similar procedure to elicit criteria
from professional buyers to establish selection criteria,
and they further used an importance Likert scale as meas-
urement rather than a “check Yes or No” scale used by
most of the selection studies to date. This scale was found
to better represent respondents’ beliefs than the dichoto-
mous scale in use by other studies. Li, Fun, and Hung
(1997) suggest the use of such scaled criteria and the
establishment of a single scale score for each criterion
through the use of multiple items averaged to determine
that score. This program used academics and profession-
als to verify, expand, and edit the criteria found through an
extensive literature review, and it also used a sliding scale
of responses to determine the level of compliance for each
criteria. Criterion scores (e.g., marketing management or
societal impact) were determined through averaging multi-
ple item scores. Paired samples, independent samples,
and regression analysis tests were used to examine the
data generated by the program.
Results
Successful Management Practices
The firm assessment portion of the program evaluated firm
management practices by using 34 items grouped into the
following major management categories: marketing man-
agement, strategic direction, technical management, pro-
duction management, and financial and accounting man-
agement. Table 1 shows the mean ratings for all firms in
each of these categories. The mean statistic was deter-
mined by a simple averaging of the responses for each
item in the category. The number of items for each catego-
ry varied from 3 (technology) to 10 (strategic direction), but
the numerical range for each item was identical. The most
desired response for each item was given the value of five,
and the least desired response was given a value of one.
The median value, three, was assigned to the response
that was marginally acceptable for a potential supplier.
Responses with values less than three were considered
unacceptable management practices. By averaging
responses for each category, an overall assessment of a
firm’s preparedness in that category could be determined.
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As shown in Table 1, the average firm in the program
was best prepared in financial and accounting manage-
ment. Often, firms chose to use outside professionals to
assist with these functions because they were too small to
have professionally qualified staff members trained to han-
dle these responsibilities. In general, firms were also rela-
tively well prepared in production management and strate-
gic direction. The mean statistics above 3.50 indicate that
the average response was above the marginal (3)
response for most items. On the other hand, firms were
much less well prepared for marketing and technological
concerns. For each of these categories, while the mean is
above 3.00, more items were answered with marginal (or
worse) responses than for the former three categories.
Table 2 examines the differences between successful
and unsuccessful firms from this program. Success was
determined as having the firm’s product recommended to
buyers for further review. While ultimate success would
actually be something similar to having a profitable prod-
uct on a mass retailer’s shelves, the vagaries of the mar-
ket would make this harder to predict. An excellent product
from an excellent firm might be rejected by a mass mer-
chandiser because of an oversaturated market, yet the
product could find limited success in a regional or local
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Content Areas Evaluation Criteria Content Areas Evaluation Criteria
Societal Impact Legality of the product Competitive Capabilities Perceived appearance
Product safety Perceived superiority
Environmental impact Perceived durability
Societal welfare impact Perceived cost
Market entry ease
Business Risk Functional feasibility Competition expectations
Production feasibility Legal protection
Market readiness
Capital investment requirements Management Requirements Technology transfer options
Payback period New venture options
Return on investment Marketing experience
Marketing research Technical experience
Research and development Financial experience
Production experience
Demand Analysis Market potential In-store promotions
Sales potential Merchandising potential
Demand life cycle
Demand stability Overall Venture Assessment Production capability
Product life cycle Quality control measures
Product line potential Marketing capability
Technical capability
Market Acceptance Customer attitudes Financial capability
Customer learning curve Overall venture readiness
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marketplace. Besides, this program was designed to edu-
cate manufacturers on acceptable management practices
and to provide a review process for buyers, not to actually
select the products that a mass retailer should have on its
shelves nationwide.
The results in Table 2 illustrate that forwarded firms
were those that were better prepared across the board.
The mean response for each category was statistically sig-
nificantly higher for forwarded firms than for nonforwarded
firms. Successful firms reported above-marginal (3.50 or
above) averages for practices for each category, while
unsuccessful firms reported the same level of profession-
alism for only one category: financial and accounting man-
agement. Earlier results seemed to indicate areas for con-
cern about this study’s participants and their marketing
and technology management performance. The results in
this table seem to identify this weakness as the responsi-
bility of the unsuccessful SMEs alone. Successful firms
reported more sophisticated management practices than
unsuccessful firms for all items in this self-assessment
with one exception: delivery schedule reliability. For this
one item, there was no discernible difference in the
responses of these two types of firms.
Successful Product Characteristics
The product evaluation portion of the program assessed
product readiness for mass merchandising through 41
items grouped into the following categories: societal
impact, business risk, demand analysis, market 
acceptance, competitive capabilities, and management
requirements. This assessment process was completed by
independent evaluators reviewing product characteristics
and documents filed by firm executives in the program
application process. Table 3 shows the mean results for
each category for all participating firms. As with the self-
assessment process, the mean statistic was determined
by a simple averaging of the responses for each item in
the category. The most desired response for each item
was given the value of five, and the least desired response
was given a value of one. The median value, three, was
assigned to the response that was marginally acceptable
for a potential product. Responses with values less than
three were considered unacceptable product characteris-
tics. By averaging responses for each category, an overall
assessment of a product’s readiness in that category could
be determined.
The results in Table 3 show that business risk was
judged positively by the program’s evaluators and that the
societal impact of submitted products was not seen as a
major concern. The average product was not seen to have
many potential legal or social liabilities, and its profit poten-
tial was judged, on average, to be helped by functionality,
production feasibility, low capital costs, and low resource
requirements. Evaluators rated the usefulness of the prod-
ucts relatively well, but they found greater problems in
other areas. While market acceptance was judged 
positively, demand was judged to be marginal, and partic-
ipating firms’ competing capabilities were judged negative-
ly. In other words, the products themselves might fill a
potential consumer need well, but the demand levels for
the products and the ability of firms to compete against
entrenched larger manufacturers were suspect. SMEs had
little management experience in producing these items in




Firm Assessment Mean Standard
Category (n=1690) Deviation
Financial and Accounting 
Management 3.74 0.93
Production Management 3.56 0.73
Strategic Direction 3.52 0.73
Marketing Management 3.31 0.71
Technical Management 3.15 0.93
Note: Each assessment category is statistically 
significantly greater than the next at the p < 0.01 level.
Table 2
Firm Assessment Statistics by Forwarded (Success) Status
Forwarded Not Forwarded
Firm Assessment Category (Successful) (Unsuccessful)
(n=539) (n=1151)
Financial and Accounting Management 4.11 0.66 3.57 0.99
Production Management 3.87 0.65 3.42 0.72
Strategic Direction 3.87 0.59 3.36 0.74
Marketing Management 3.61 0.66 3.17 0.69
Technical Management 3.53 0.88 2.97 0.91
Note: Successful firm statistics are statistically significantly greater than unsuccessful firm statistics at the p < 0.001 level.
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the large quantities required by a mass merchandiser, and
they faced a demand curve for their products that was
often flat or on the decline. Further, given the inexperience
and small size of these SMEs, their competitive capabili-
ties were poor against larger firms producing the same or
similar products. Their products were often too similar to
popularly accepted products or were not distinctive
enough to be viewed as different or better than their poten-
tial competitors. Firms that were unsuccessful often found
themselves making a newer version of a mousetrap, but
they were unable to distinguish the superiority of their
product to other cheaper versions already on the market.
Table 4 compares the evaluations of successful and
unsuccessful firms. As with the firm assessment process,
successful firms were found to receive higher ratings than
unsuccessful firms. Successful firms submitted better-pre-
pared products with better market possibilities than did
products from unsuccessful firms. All categories, with the
exception of societal impact, were judged higher for 
successful firms than for unsuccessful firms. Apparently,
the societal impact of these products was judged to be 
relatively minimal, and few legal, safety, or environmental
problems were considered likely with the average product.
Successful firms were supplying a product that was 
superior in almost every aspect to those supplied by
unsuccessful SMEs. This attention to all the details (rather
than focusing on one characteristic or market-oriented
quirk [e.g., a trendy name or fleeting consumer prefer-
ence]) seemed to be a major success factor.
Combined Strength
Conventional wisdom, practical experience, and academic
research have shown that the most successful SMEs are
those with well-managed firms and excellent products.
Weaknesses in either or both decrease the chances of
success. This study focused on determining the impor-
tance of each of these to the success of participating firms
in this program.
Regression analysis was used to determine the effect of
the major independent variables (firm management and
product characteristics) on the dependent variable (for-
warding status). Because both independent variables are
hypothesized as important to success, an interactive effect
was added to the analysis (firm X product). The results of
this analysis are shown in Table 5. The strongest effect
was found in the combined variable, with firm assessment
and product characteristics providing secondary explana-
tory information. The combined variable explained 23 per-
cent of the variation, and the other two variables added 5.5
percent to the adjusted r-square. The total 28.5 percent
was significant at the p < 0.001 level.
Discussion
It can be argued that the use of forwarding status as a
proxy for success borders on a self-fulfilling prophecy in
that only the best ventures would have been forwarded to
buyers for review in any case. Poorer ventures would have
been rejected (and therefore identified as unsuccessful) as
a result of the assessment ratings, so defining success as




Firm Assessment Mean Standard
Category (n=1690) Deviation
Business Risk 4.29 0.54
Societal Impact 4.07 0.36
Market Acceptance 3.41 0.44
Management Requirements 3.12 0.47
Demand Analysis 3.00 0.51
Competitive Capabilities 2.96 0.43
Note: Each assessment category is statistically 
significantly greater than the next at the p < 0.01 level.
Table 4
Product Evaluation Statistics by Forwarded (Success) Status
Forwarded Not Forwarded
Firm Assessment Category (Successful) (Unsuccessful)
(n=539) (n=1151)
Business Risk (*) 4.51 0.50 4.19 0.53
Societal Impact 4.09 0.35 4.07 0.36
Market Acceptance (*) 3.60 0.40 3.32 0.43
Management Requirements (*) 3.43 0.43 2.98 0.42
Demand Analysis (*) 3.24 0.48 2.90 0.49
Competitive Capabilities (*) 3.08 0.39 2.90 0.43
Successful firm statistics are statistically significantly greater than unsuccessful firm statistics at the p < 0.001 level where
marked (*).
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successfully navigating through the program could be a bit
self-serving. There is some truth to this concern, but other
proxies might not actually serve the research better. In
truth, the use of this criterion is not a poor choice. Piercy
and Cravens (1997) suggest that performance evaluations
such as the ones used in this study are similar to those
used by buyers worldwide. They also suggest that the
level of performance generally correlates well to the actu-
al selection choice made later by larger firms. They also
suggest that buyers using this set of criteria for selection
tend to have higher performance levels themselves in the
marketplace.
Why not use other conventional measures such as prof-
itability, longevity, or even market success of the evaluat-
ed product? Measures of success were actually a part of
the evaluation process (e.g., the financial stability of the
firm and the success of the product on local or regional
markets were both items in the assessment instruments).
Additionally, while records were kept on whether the prod-
uct actually made it to a mass merchandiser’s shelves,
use of that variable in a regression analysis was found to
add little to the explanatory strength of the model. While
on-shelf products showed the same level of difference in
quality of firm and product compared to rejected products,
they showed very little difference to other forwarded 
products that did not make it to a mass retailer’s shelves.
Only environmental impact, product appearance, and 
selling price showed significant differences in product
characteristics, and only firm focus on quality and intensi-
ty of board of director involvement were significantly differ-
ent in the firm assessment process. However, the actual
mean differences in these variables were relatively
insignificant.
Firms which were forwarded but were not accepted for
a mass retailer’s shelves were also encouraged to pursue
other channels of distribution such as local or regional
retailers or specialty merchandisers (such as sporting
goods stores or pharmacies). Even those firms that were
successful in gaining a place on a mass merchandiser’s
shelves were counseled to pursue other channels as well.
Further, many of the rejected products were not necessar-
ily turned down because they were low quality or because
the SMEs producing them were poorly managed. Often
the products were attempting to enter a saturated mass
market (how many new dish detergents could mass retail-
ers carry?) or were trying to enter mass markets when
specialty markets were a better outlet. A follow-up study of
these program participants is planned to determine their
current state of operations and profitability and to see the
long-term effects of the educational aspects of the 
program.
Finally, the results of this study confirm previous
research which suggests that multiple factors affect the
success of SMEs. Both the firm and the product need to be
of superior quality for SMEs to be successful, and this is
especially true for firms wishing to enter the mass mer-
chandising market. Each has its own effect on success,
but the regression model resulting from this study sug-
gests that there is an interactive effect of the two variables.
Again, SMEs need to spend time ensuring that both the
firm and the product are of superior quality if they want to
find even moderate success in today’s marketplace.
Retailers are interested in placing quality products on their
shelves, but they are also interested in doing business with
quality suppliers that can become long-term partners.
Poorly run firms, no matter how good their products, are
unlikely to find larger retailers willing to take the chance of
entering partnerships with firms that may be unable to pro-
vide those products on a consistent basis with consistent
quality.
Conclusions
This study examined the results of a program intended to
act as a selection tool for mass merchandisers and a
development tool for small manufacturers. The evaluation
program assessed the management practices and prod-
ucts of potential suppliers. Prior to assessment, it is impor-
tant to note that, based on past experience, buyers for
mass merchandisers considered SMEs a poor risk as
potential suppliers of retail goods. They estimated that
only 1 out of 300 SMEs who contacted them had a viable
venture (a strong firm and a potentially successful product)
(Udell, Atehortua, and Parker 1995). 
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Table 5
Regression Analysis—Prediction of Forwarded Status
Independent Variable R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Significance
R-Square Change Of Change
Firm Assessment
X
Product Evaluation 0.481 0.231 0.230 0.231 0.001
Firm Assessment 0.530 0.281 0.280 0.050 0.001
Product Evaluation 0.534 0.286 0.284 0.005 0.001
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One of the goals of this program was to help SMEs
become more successful in reaching a mass merchandis-
er’s shelves with their products. The conventional wisdom
from academics and practitioners alike was that a venture
needed a well-managed firm and a marketable product to
be considered in a supplier partnership with a large retail
corporation. Even then, the chances of success were
about 1 in 300. Using the results of almost 1,700 
participants in this program, we can theorize that the con-
ventional wisdom was correct: a well-managed firm or a
marketable product alone cannot secure a partnership.
Both are critical. But even having both is not a guarantee
of success. Of the 25 firms (1.5% of the total participants)
that initially had high ratings for both the firm and the 
product, only 2 (8%) actually made it to the retailer’s
shelves. While the majority of accepted products came
from firms that initially had low ratings for either the firm or
the product or both, the acceptance rate for these firms
was in the 4 to 5 percent range. Excellent firm–product
combinations had about twice the chance of being accept-
ed by mass merchandisers. Even this conclusion is con-
servative. Those firms with poor initial ratings had to make
changes before they secured acceptance.
Almost one-third of the SMEs participating in this 
program (32.7%) were judged suitable for review by the
merchandisers, and about 1 in 6 of these suitable firms
(15.3%) ultimately were accepted as suppliers. Even
though about 95 percent of all participating firms were 
ultimately rejected either by the program or the buyer, the 
1-in-20 success rate compares favorably to the 1-in-300
rate cited earlier as a buyer’s expected acceptance rate.
Even acknowledging that the program participants were
possibly the best 20 percent of potential suppliers to the
merchandiser, the acceptance rate is still more than 1 per-
cent, about three times higher than would otherwise be
expected. Thus, this program seems to function well as a
supplier selection tool that aids mass merchandisers in
choosing quality vendors and as a supplier development
tool that helps small manufacturers identify their strengths
and weaknesses in the purchasing process. 
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This study examines entrepreneurship and assesses its
relevance to health care organizations through a detailed
description of the optimal environment, organizational 
factors, and managerial roles in the entrepreneurship
process. The article finds entrepreneurship processes to
be especially useful to health care organizations as they
struggle to survive in the competitive managed care 
environment.
The U.S. health care environment is extremely turbu-lent, competitive, and complex. With managed carerapidly dominating the health care delivery, strate-
gies to cut costs and improve quality and access are
imperative to organizational survival. Faced with financial
pressures, health care organizations are emulating market
strategies and behaving more like for-profit businesses.
For instance, hospitals, health maintenance organizations,
and physician groups are undergoing organizational
restructuring through various negotiations of contractual
agreements and formation of integrated delivery systems
to result in even more complex relationships. Operating
under these circumstances, organizational viability has
been haphazard with success harder to predict and
demise a common occurrence. Strategies that rely on pri-
vatization and integration are only the beginning.
Additional multidimensional strategies that analyze the
environment, examine internal organizational processes,
and investigate managerial traits, roles, and responsibili-
ties are needed for long-term survival of health care 
organizations.
This article examines the health care industry using the
concept of entrepreneurship as an appropriate approach
for bettering the outlook of health care organizations.
While numerous studies have been conducted on entre-
preneurship in the hopes of increasing knowledge in this
developing and dynamic area, most of these studies have
been found in economics, business, psychology, market-
ing, or industrial management. That is, little research has
been demonstrated on entrepreneurship in health servic-
es. Health care topics elude the use of entrepreneurship.
Health care management textbooks skirt around the issue
and focus only on roles and strategies of managers and
their relationship to innovation and leadership. Other gen-
eral health care textbooks emphasize the health care
delivery system and describe the environment as 
turbulent. Additional research on health policy seeks to
make changes in response to rising health care costs,
decreased quality, and access. Unfortunately, all topics
within health care research manage to evade entrepre-
neurship while only developing fiscal options for health
care organizational survival. Delving further into the 
literature leads to a few articles that describe continuous
technological innovations in the pharmaceutical industry
(Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright 2001) and entre-
preneurial characteristics of senior nursing executives as
“having personal integrity,” “possessing a vision,” and
“being a strategic thinker” (Ballein 1998; Parker 1998;
White and Begun 1998). There is a lack of research on the
use of entrepreneurship as an important and creative 
technique for dealing with the complexities in the health
care environment.  
Due to this deficiency, this article investigates and
expands upon the multidimensional use of entrepreneur-
ship as applicable to health care organizations. The intent
is to show that the need for more innovative leadership in
today’s health care environment can be accomplished
through entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship has been
thriving in other industries and should also be used in
health care to bring about growth. This research is 
divided into four parts. The first section defines entrepre-
neurship in several disciplines. The second part focuses
on the U.S. health care system, particularly the external
environment which has served as the subject of 
widespread research and policy interest. The transplanta-
tion of business entrepreneurship into health care is
described in this section. As the linkage is made, it will
become more apparent that entrepreneurship can and
should occur in health care organizations, especially since
all health care organizations face similar resource scarcity
and financial complexities. Thus, the third part delves into
organizational issues, including determining organization-
al culture that supports entrepreneurship. The final part
investigates the roles of managers in the entrepreneurship
process for health care organizations, particularly, traits
and characteristics of managers. The article concludes by
explaining the use of entrepreneurship as practical and
applicable to the health care sector.
Research on Entrepreneurship
While the term entrepreneurship has been used for 
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centuries, there is no single definition. Instead,
researchers are continuing to expand, redefine, and 
innovate entrepreneurship in many different fields. For
instance, entrepreneurship dates back to the 1700s by
French economists and was associated with risk-bearing
activities in the economy. Additional definitions of entrepre-
neurship refer to “an act of innovation that involves 
endowing existing resources with new wealth-producing
capacity” (Drucker 1985). Still others define entrepreneur-
ship as the examination of how, by whom, and with what
effects to create, evaluate, and exploit opportunities and
future goods and services (Shane and Venkataraman
2000). Furthermore, entrepreneurship can be related to
productivity, where the entrepreneur is responsible for
determining optimal production, investment, and financing
decisions (Williams and Thompson 1998). 
Although there is no consensus on a precise definition
of entrepreneurship, one of the most commonly cited 
definitions is that of economist Schumpeter who used an
economic model to explain the entrepreneurial process.
He argued for five scenarios in which entrepreneurial inno-
vation could occur: (1) the introduction of a new good, or
of a new quality of good, (2) the introduction of a new
method of production, (3) the opening of a new market (4)
the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials
and (5) the carrying about of new organization in any
industry (1936). 
Since then, a more comprehensive approach was
developed by Timmons, who defines entrepreneurship as
the 
…ability to create and build something from practical-
ly nothing. It is initiating, doing, achieving, and build-
ing an enterprise or organization, rather than just
watching, analyzing or describing one. It is the knack
for sensing an opportunity where others see chaos,
contradiction and confusion. … [I}t is the willingness
to take calculated risks, both personal and financial –
and then do everything possible to get the odds in
your favour (1989).
Timmons’ work suggests that external factors influence
and shape the success of entrepreneurship. He also
claims that the key to successful entrepreneurship is
understanding opportunity, being able to match the organ-
ization and situation to the key players (1989).
Furthermore, Kuratko and Hodgetts assert that entrepre-
neurship is made up of multidimensional processes involv-
ing the environment, organizations, and individuals (1998).  
The External Environment
The environment plays a crucial role in the creation of
entrepreneurship. The external environment is made up of
two parts: the societal environment and task environment
(Kuratko and Hodgetts 1998). The societal environment
encompasses economic, political, legal, and technological
forces that influence long-term decisions of organizations.
The task environment is made up of elements that are
directly affected by an organization’s operations. 
Societal Environment
The societal environment can be illustrated by the current
state of the U.S. economy which is experiencing sharp
decline, as more businesses are forced to lay off employ-
ees or even worse file for bankruptcy. In the midst of this
turmoil, policies are aimed at improving the economy by
dropping interest rates, which makes it easier to acquire
loans. On the technology side, dotcom companies are
struggling to survive. Under these circumstances, the 
environment can be described as lean, lacking access to
resources, and tending to promote more competitive 
practices. These factors challenge organizations’ quest for
growth and profitability and has led to the demise of many
organizations (Zahra and Neubaum 1998). On the other
hand, many organizations can survive, succeed, and
thrive under these harsh environment conditions. In fact,
adverse environments force organizations to innovate,
take risks, and become entrepreneurial (Zahra and Covin
1995).  Entrepreneurial strategies can help an organiza-
tion move to richer environments by improving its 
operating practices, innovating its strategies, and enabling
it to merge with other organizations. In other words, when
societal environment forecasts a gloomy picture, entrepre-
neurial activities can be promoted to enhance organiza-
tional growth. 
For example, in the battles for control of the automobile
industry, Henry Ford’s innovative strategy for Ford Motor
Company was based on improving its operating practices
through “vertical integration, carefully engineered produc-
tion, and product simplicity” (Burgelman, Maidique, and
Wheelwright 2001). Thus, Ford introduced mass-produc-
tion and mass-market techniques. However, William
Durant, owner of Buick Motors, sought a different strategy
in which he proposed mergers with other companies. He
found the automobile industry to be swamped by hundreds
of carmakers each only producing a few models.
Operating in such a competitive environment, Durant
believed that manufacturers would benefit by banding
together. His strategy, “based on acquisitions of smaller
companies, marketing power, sales coverage, and product
variety” (Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright 2001),
led to the creation of General Motors (GM). Although GM
was created in 1908, today, it continues to steer around
competitors and maintain its status as the world’s number
one maker of cars and trucks. 
Wal-Mart Stores, the world’s leading retailer, has suc-
cessfully crushed its competitors using its basic strategy of
supplying well-known brands in sparsely populated areas
and offering products 15 percent lower than other stores in
the same location. It began in 1962 as a discount store in
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Arkansas. Wal-Mart maintains its small-town flavor, and is
famous for low prices, friendly workers, patriotic products,
and a wide selection of merchandise, including food, cloth-
ing, electronics, and prescription drugs. In fact, its pre-
scription drug sales make it North America’s third largest
pharmacy. With the opening of its Supercenters that focus
on groceries, Wal-Mart is now the nation’s largest seller of
groceries. 
The 2001–2002 U.S. economic recession poses a dif-
ferent yet equally daunting challenge for large corpora-
tions. In the case of General Electric Company (GE), to
recover from economic slowdown, it has “adopted a strat-
egy of pursuing only high-achieving ventures and dumping
those that didn’t perform” (Hoover’s Company Profile
Database 2003). New CEO Jeff Immelt understands that
the current lean economic environment affects not only
GE, but also businesses that depend on GE services. His
innovative efforts to maneuver in this environment include
expansion of services outside of the United States and
conducting more business on the web. 
The four cases above describe the ability by large 
corporations to develop and sustain entrepreneurial activ-
ities in spite of the competition. In-depth scrutinizing and
understanding of forces in the external environment led to
the exploitation of multidimensional strategies to produce
successful outcomes.
Task Environment
The task environment refers to the specific industry envi-
ronment. Examples of entrepreneurial activities in other
industries, such as the automobile, telecommunications,
and computers can provide advice and warnings to the
health care industry. The above descriptions of Ford’s and
GM’s strategies only skimmed the surface; further illustra-
tion of these two companies lead to a greater understand-
ing of the need for entrepreneurial strategies in response
to industry challenges. Two notable struggles occurred in
the automobile industry. The first was the 1930s’ battle
between automakers and workers. Working conditions
were dangerous and laborers protested. As a result, the
United Auto Workers Union was formed. It brought work-
ers bargaining power and protection at a high cost of
“work-rule rigidity and the polarization of workers and man-
agement” (Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright 2001).
Labor–management struggles continued into the 1970s,
until the second significant industry challenge took on
precedence. The U.S. auto industry nearly collapsed with
the emergence of the Japanese automobile. Toyota com-
bined “product variety, quality and efficiency…. with cus-
tomer-focused design, concurrent engineering, flexible
manufacturing, dedicated workers and networks of suppli-
ers” (Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright 2001). To
defend against this new wave of business rivals, major
U.S. automakers engaged in innovative entrepreneurial
practices that led to the total transformation of the auto
industry. It resulted in competitive collaboration. Toyota’s
joint venture with GM and Mazda’s with Ford allow these
automakers the opportunity to assess the progress of their
rivals and learn from them.
Similarly, the telecommunications industry also experi-
enced enormous changes. The American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T) Company monopolized the telecommu-
nications industry from 1877 to 1970s. To accomplish this
feat, CEO Theodore Vail’s first strategy was to buy out its
competitors. In danger of an antitrust lawsuit, Vail
launched a major lobbying campaign to convince govern-
ment that having a single telephone company was in the
best interest of the nation. Having been recognized as a
monopoly, Vail promised universal services and its profits
would fund local services and research. However, in 1968,
a breach of AT&T’s monopoly occurred when the Federal
Communications Commission allowed equipment suppli-
ers to compete with AT&T. In 1974, AT&T lost its monopoly
status when MCI filed an antitrust suit and won. Since
then, the telecommunications industry has evolved into
hypercompetition with its four markets: wireline, wireless,
cable, and internet. AT&T must now coexist and struggle
for market share with competitors. Realizing that AT&T has
lost the majority of its long-distance business, CEO C.
Michael Armstrong pursued aggressive multidimensional
strategies to acquire the broadband, cable, and internet
sectors which allow AT&T to penetrate all four segments of
the market, thereby offering customers a “one-stop 
shopping” convenience (Burgelman, Maidique, and
Wheelwright 2001).
Likewise, Tandy Corporation and Apple Computers
introduced the personal computer (PC) industry in the late
1970s through their revolutionary packaging of hardware,
software, and services. Apple’s strategy relied on cooper-
ation with independent software developers, while Tandy
took on a vertically integrated approach. Tandy’s tight con-
trol over its organization resulted in slower growth, while
Apple’s reliance on participation with other companies led
to its larger market domination. International Business
Machines (IBM) entered the PC industry in 1981. It also
took on Apple’s strategy of building on a community of
partners. IBM generated more demand than it could meet.
As a result, it developed nonexclusive relationships with
suppliers, such as Microsoft, Intel, and Lotus, to help meet
demand. Unfortunately, IBM did not take precautions to
enforce its patents against clone makers. Thus, other sup-
pliers were able to put together common standards for
hardware and software without IBM’s involvement. This
ultimately led to the decline of IBM products as Intel and
Microsoft now dominate the new computer market. IBM’s
failings occurred in its expansion stages when it could not
keep up with innovations, while Intel surpassed with the
innovative microchip and Microsoft with its software pack-
ages (Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright 2001).
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Successes and failures in entrepreneurial activities of
other industries serve as guidance for the health care
industry. In the health care industry, the task environment
is made up of providers (i.e., hospitals, physicians), suppli-
ers (i.e., pharmaceutical companies), competitors,
patients, special interest groups (i.e., American
Association of Retired Persons, Health Insurance
Association of America), and governments (federal, state,
and local).  The health care industry has been depicted as
turbulent (Shortell and Kaluzny 2000), which is character-
ized by highly complex and fast-paced changes, particu-
larly due to the rapid growth of managed care as a strate-
gy for lowering costs, improving access and quality.
Furthermore, it is also made complex by the multitude of
interests directly and indirectly involved in the delivery of
health care. That is, private sector businesses are largely
responsible for the development and delivery of drugs and
medical supplies while government agencies regulate its
actual delivery (Ginter, Swayne, and Duncan 2002). Thus,
in times of turbulence, the ability to anticipate changes,
recognize external forces, and meet the needs of the mar-
ket greatly enhances the chances of success.
Forces that affect the health care industry include aging
of the population, increasing ethnic and cultural diversity,
growth of new technology, especially medical advance-
ments, changes in supply and education of health profes-
sionals, social morbidity that changes from acute to chron-
ic care, and globalization of the world economy  (Shortell
and Kaluzny 2000). For example, 13.2 percent of the gross
national product was spent on medical care in the United
States in 2000 (Levit, et al. 2002). The federal government
estimates that national health expenditures will rise at a
higher rate as baby boomers become eligible for Medicare
and as new technology becomes available to improve
quality of life. Those over 65 years old, who currently rep-
resent 12.3 percent of the population, fill 40 percent of
hospital beds (Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2002). At
the same time, government continues to subsidize the
health care demands of the aged and poor, which means
a heavier burden for the working population. At the socie-
tal level, choices are considered and must be made to
decide upon the amount of resources to be spent on pro-
viding health services. Those decisions, not easily made
by governmental policies, influence individual health care
organizational priorities.
Health care organizations are affected by societal envi-
ronment changes and their own industry changes, even
though organizations may vary by complexity, susceptibil-
ity to change, and competitiveness. For example, hospitals
exist in highly competitive, complex, and rapidly changing
environments. Government policies that emphasize cost
containment have pressured hospitals to perform more
efficiently and cost effectively. To do so, hospitals must
innovate by restructuring to form horizontal and vertical
integrated delivery systems. As a result, two major cate-
gories of healthcare systems have emerged: (1) geo-
graphically scattered systems have a small market share
in each of many different health care regions and (2) geo-
graphically focused systems attempt to capture substantial
market share in one or a small number of geographic
areas. Many church-related health care systems and for-
profit organizations follow the former model, while larger
health care systems resemble the latter (Griffith 1999). 
Kaiser Permanente (KP), the nation’s largest health
care system, has been able to replicate its geographically
focused model in many different sites. It is the nation’s old-
est independent, prepaid group practice, serving the
health care needs of more than 6.5 million members in 16
states and the District of Columbia. In 1990, KP’s revenue
totaled $8.4 billion. KP, a not-for-profit practice, represents
a prototype health care organization in the changing health
care environment. It combines the insurance function with
the delivery function while providing a continuum of care to
its defined populations. KP encompasses three organiza-
tions, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, and the Permanente Medical Groups. The
Health Plan contracts with individuals and groups to pro-
vide health care benefits through its Hospitals and Medical
Groups. The Hospital Groups own and operate communi-
ty hospitals and outpatient facilities. The Medical Groups
form partnerships with physicians (Shortell and Kaluzny
1997). KP is a leading health care organization and many
of its strategies exemplify the concept of entrepreneurship.
Specifically, the KP strategic model of integrating all com-
ponents of service delivery is emulated by other health
care organizations, particularly managed care organiza-
tions. KP’s ability to establish effective physician relation-
ships through its Medical Groups serves as a model for
other health care systems that seek to combine physicians
with hospitals. KP is a leader in the development of infor-
mation systems that tie together patients and providers
across the continuum of care to produce high organiza-
tional performance. In fact, KP’s entrepreneurial activities
have long established its status as a benchmark organiza-
tion, thereby setting best industry practices for other
organizations to follow. 
Other examples of large health care systems include
Intermountain, serving most of Utah and parts of adjacent
states; Mayo, operating in Minnesota, Arizona, and
Florida; Uni-Health in southern California; Henry Ford
Health System in southeast Michigan; and Geisinger in
Pennsylvania. The entrepreneurial activities of these
health care systems are exemplified by their multifacet
approaches to exchange with the open environment, align
partners, improve their processes, and empower workers
(Griffith 1999).
Another innovative way for health care systems to
expand their market share has been the conversion from
not-for-profit status to for-profit status. This change signi-
fies the industry’s movement toward more business-like
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practices. For example, the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) of Pennsylvania converted to a for-
profit status in 1981 to become U.S. Health Care Systems,
Inc. In this way, it was able to obtain venture capital 
investments. 
A prominent example of a large health care corporation
undertaking entrepreneurial activities in response to
demands in the environment is the case of Blue Cross
(BC) and Blue Shield Association. BC was established in
1929 as the precursor to managed care when Baylor
University offered schoolteachers prepaid hospital care for
$6 a year. By 1935, 11 states operated BC plans. In 1946,
as states began sponsoring prepaid plans to cover physi-
cian fees, Blue Shield was created. By 1960, BC insured
about one third of the U.S. population. In the next decade,
BC administered Medicare and other government health
plans. By 1970, half of BC’s premiums came from govern-
ment entities. In response to consumer demands for 
preventive care, BC and Blue Shield shifted their focus to
prevention. Furthermore, they adopted hospital control
measures. As the two organizations lost market share to
other competitors, their major strategy led to the merge of
the two organizations in 1982. To remain viable in the
highly competitive environment, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield (BCBS) engaged in several entrepreneurial activi-
ties, including converting to a for-profit status, merging
and forming alliances with other health care organizations,
and expanding globally. The BC of California became the
first chapter to give up its tax-free not-for-profit status
when it was bought by WellPoint Health Networks, a 
managed care subsidiary. Other BCBS soon followed in
the switch to for-profit status. BC of Connecticut merged
with insurance provider Anthem in 1997. Anthem later
acquired and formed affiliates with BCBS in Colorado,
Maine, and New Hampshire. Empire BCBS of New York
converted to a for-profit practice in 2000. Half of the
nation’s BCBS operators formed an alliance called
BluesCONNECT as a strategy to compete with national
health plans by offering employers one nationwide bene-
fits organization. In an unprecedented lawsuit of BCBS in
35 states against the tobacco industry, BCBS gained large
settlements to treat patients with smoking-related 
illnesses. A final innovative strategy is BCBS’s move to
assemble a network of caregivers in Europe, South
America, and Asia in its efforts to aim at worldwide health
care coverage (Hoover’s Company Profile Database
2003).
The health care industry, similar to the automobile,
telecommunications, and computer industries, is becom-
ing increasingly complex and competitive and has result-
ed in interorganizational networks (Shortell and Kaluzny
2000). Under these harsh environmental conditions, 
entrepreneurship activities that have succeeded in other
industries are transplanted to the health care industry to
promote success.
Internal Environment: The Organization 
The external environment heavily influences the functions
of the internal environment, which consists of the organi-
zation itself, its structure, culture, and resources.
Organization structure describes its authority, communica-
tion, and work flow. Culture is the pattern of beliefs, value,
and behaviors shared by the organization’s members.
Resources are the assets used to form the organization’s
products and services. As the external environment
becomes more turbulent, the internal organization must
take measures to reduce uncertainty. 
According to a study conducted by Moon (1999), struc-
tural factors in the organization that affect entrepreneur-
ship include hierarchy, formalization, and centralization.
More levels of hierarchy lead to extra layers of communi-
cation and more managerial burdens in decision-making
processes and tasks. In this way, managers are less like-
ly to engage in risk-taking behaviors since they require
added time and effort to gain communication approvals.
Similarly, a formalized structure with required paperwork
and written rules tends to cause administrative delay and
poor communications and results in reductions in mana-
gerial risk-taking and entrepreneurial activities.
Centralization affects entrepreneurship in two ways. In a
centralized organization, senior-level managers have
more authority over their subordinates. On the other hand,
middle- and lower-level managers have less decision-
making authority. Thus, a centralized structure offers more
risk-taking opportunities for top managers, yet it restricts
entrepreneurship activities for middle- and lower-level
managers. 
In the automobile industry, both Ford and GM were able
to innovatively manage their mega bureaucratic opera-
tions through decentralized management. Sloan, presi-
dent of GM from 1923 to 1937 created the multiproduct
lines for its diverse company, so that GM became the pro-
totype of the modern multidivisional company. In health
care, multidivisional designs are found in most academic
health centers that operate in highly uncertain environ-
ments combined with complex organizational relation-
ships formed between medical schools and hospitals. For
instance, the University of Miami/Jackson Memorial
Medical Center is an example of a multidivisional design. 
Maintaining and/or altering structure is initiated by 
senior-level management. Thus, senior-level managers
are responsible for entrepreneurial activities such as risk-
taking decisions. Entrepreneurial changes and innova-
tions include fundamental design and structure of report-
ing relationships and authority, clinical and managerial
information systems, management control systems and
goals, policies, and directions of the organization. In some
cases, organizations are innovating to gain greater opera-
tional flexibility and control, more rapid decision making
and sharing resources.
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For instance, going back to the case of Wal-Mart, the
retailer has capitalized on three organizational capabilities:
(1) building incentives to ensure employee commitment,
(2) communicating with remote located stores, and (3) 
setting up an efficient distribution system that allows for
joint purchasing, shared facilities, and systematic ordering.
The latter strategy is Wal-Mart’s trademark whereby 
warehouses serve a group of stores no more than a day’s
drive from the distribution center (Burgelman, Maidique,
and Wheelwright 2001). Thus, Wal-Mart has been 
able to share resources while gaining operational 
flexibility.
A health care example of operational flexibility and shar-
ing of resources is shown by the partnership between the
Somerville Hospital and Cambridge Hospital in
Massachusetts to form the Community Care Network pro-
gram. Community needs assessments were conducted in
both cities and identified similar top priorities. As a result,
they collaborated to create the Somerbridge Community
Health Partnership to coordinate health care needs for
both communities. Their collaborative efforts resulted in
the sharing of resources and greater opportunities for 
residents to gain access to health care (Shortell and
Kaluzny 2000).
Organizational culture is considered a key element that
promotes entrepreneurship in organizations; hence, it is a
critical factor that determines success or failure of organi-
zational entrepreneurial activities (Moon 1999). Changes
in culture must be incorporated into organizational reform
strategies to enhance entrepreneurship. These changes
include emphasizing higher levels of trust and mission
clarity and valuing employees’ commitment and contribu-
tions to the organization. For example, Baptist Medical
Center in Birmingham believes its Christian values and
missions are essential to the organization’s success. Thus,
it redeveloped its mission statement to outline four core
values: quality care, individual dignity, cost efficiency, and
community support. This strategic maneuver helped to
strengthen the organization’s culture and values and
enabled employees to gain a sense of stability in the 
complex and uncertain environment (Hernandez, Kaluzny,
and Haddock 2000).
Entrepreneurship activities enhance organizational
positions, and involve a company’s innovation, venture
activities, risk taking, proactiveness, and radical product
innovation (Zahra, Nielson, and Bogner 1999). In the case
of Sunnybrook Health Sciences Center, an academic
health science center affiliated with the University of
Toronto, the challenges were enormous as it operated in
an environment of high costs, lowered revenue, limited
funding sources, and high patient expectations of quality
and outcomes. CEO Tom Closson took on a radical
restructuring and risk-taking strategy to create a patient-
focused care center. The five-pronged approach 
emphasized decentralizing various clinical units, bringing
services to patients, promoting shared decision making,
consolidating roles and scopes of practice of support 
and clinical staff, and continuous monitoring to maintain
the patient-focused center (Leatt, Shortell, and 
Kimberly 2000). 
Entrepreneurship activities should be used by health
care organizations to improve organizational growth and
profitability and promoted as a means of achieving more
efficient, flexible, and adaptable management in turbulent
and competitive environments. 
Managerial Traits, Behaviors, and Roles that
Foster Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship can be characterized by the individuals
who are responsible for new ideas, fundamental change,
and risk taking to bring about organizational success (Bull
and Willard 1995; Kuratko and Hodgetts 1998).
Entrepreneurship activities originate from individuals
whose traits, skills, behaviors, and background are crucial
for entrepreneurial activity development. 
Entrepreneurs are persons who perceive opportunities
and assume the risks of planning and creating various
means to pursue them. Common characteristics of 
successful entrepreneurs were identified by McGrath and
MacMillan (2000) as (1) passionately seeking new oppor-
tunities, (2) pursuing opportunities with enormous disci-
pline, (3) pursuing only the best opportunities by linking
choice of options with strategy, (4) focusing on adaptive
executive, and (5) engaging the energies of everyone in
their domain. Chell, Haworth, and Brearley (1991)
describe traits of entrepreneurs as self-confidence, risk
taking, flexibility, strong desire to achieve, and independ-
ence. They point out that behaviors include total 
commitment, determination and perseverance, drive to
achieve and grow, and orientation to goals and opportuni-
ties. 
Miner created a four-way psychological typologies of
successful entrepreneurs as: 
…(1) the personal achiever type, who is prone to
motivated for self achievement, (2) the real manager
type who demonstrates high supervisory ability and
strong need for occupational advancement, (3) the
expert idea generator who enjoys coming up with
original or innovative ideas and (4) the empathic
supersalesperson type who is sociable, friendly and
supportive and encourage participation and is action
oriented (1997). 
Certainly, Henry Ford, Alfred Sloan of GM, and Sam
Walton of Wal-Mart are just a few examples of successful
entrepreneurs. In health care, the specific role of a manag-
er responsible for making significant changes has most
commonly been identified as that of leader. As a leader,
one must articulate and internalize the values of the organ-
ization, according to Edward J. Connors, past president of
Mercy Health Systems and former chair of the American
Hospital Association’s Board of Trustees (Zuckerman and
Dowling 1997). Managers can also be characterized as
strategists and designers (Zuckerman, Dowling, and
Richardson 2000). As strategists, managers must monitor
and analyze the environment prior to employing a variety
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of strategies to meet those changing needs. As designers,
managers are responsible for managing organizational
structure, innovation, and change. Another role of the
manager is that of the entrepreneur, responsible for initiat-
ing and designing change in an organization (Mintzberg
1973). Rakich, Longest, Jr., and Darr describe Mintzberg’s
entrepreneur role as that of “change agent.” That is, health
services organizations “are internally dynamic and contin-
uously affected by their environment. Managers must seek
to improve, modify, and rearrange work through planned,
conscious, and controlled change” (1992).
A health care manager’s role involves various types of
changes and innovations. These could range from intro-
duction of new products and services or redefining an
organization’s goals.  In the previous discussion of
Sunnybrook, CEO Closson drastically restructured his
organization to meet the needs of patients. In the case of
Lutheran Health Systems, CEO Michael Bice overhauled
the entire organization to create a new proactive culture
where continuous, personal, and hands-on commitment is
a priority (Zuckerman and Dowling 1997). Another exam-
ple is that of CEO Joseph A. Zaccagnino of Yale New
Haven Health System. He believes success depends on
aligning strong health care organizations (i.e., three major
hospitals) to a shared vision to create a leading integrated
delivery system. Furthermore, he recommends managers
to have broad skills, enabling them to evolve in complex
enterprises (Grazier 2003). As health care managers con-
tinue to expand their roles to develop innovations, they rely
more on entrepreneurial traits, behaviors, and skills to
result in their organizational growth.
Entrepreneurship: Applicability to 
Health Care Organizations
The health care industry is similar to other industries in
environment conditions, structure, and strategies.
Industries such as automobile and telecommunications
have undergone massive transformations in their environ-
ment and organizational structure and strategies.
Commonalities in their environment include turbulence,
inflexibility, and competitiveness. Structural similarities
include new entrants, mergers, and consolidation.
Strategies have shifted to cost accounting and manage-
ment and strategic alliances. These scenarios are very
similar to the health care industry, since it is also charac-
terized by turbulent and harsh environment conditions. In
light of these environment variables, health care has
undergone structural and strategic changes and innova-
tions to achieve organizational economies of scale,
improve utilization of resources, enhance access to 
capital, increase political power, and extend the scope of
the market (Zuckerman, Dowling, and Richardson 2000).
Samaritan Health System in Arizona, Sutter Health in
California, Intermountain Health Care in Utah, and Kaiser
Permanente are examples of health care systems that
have undergone strategic and structural changes to
improve patient care and establish competitive distinction
in their regions. Hospitals in the Rochester, New York, area
have formed a voluntary alliance to contain duplication of
services which resulted in impressive cost reductions
(Zajac and D’Aunno 1997). Similarly, hospitals in the New
England area formed the Yankee Alliance. Although chal-
lenges included reductions in membership, the benefits of
shared resource and market power have been rewarding
(Zajac, D’Aunno, and Burns 2000). Among the various
industries, similarities exist in the environment, organiza-
tional structures and managerial behaviors; thus, multidi-
mensional strategies emphasizing entrepreneurship 
practices can take place and become effective in health
care industry.  
Moreover, Chicken (2000) explains that industries 
conduct entrepreneurial activities for the exploitation of
profits or benefits. In private businesses, entrepreneurial
activities result in profit measured by monetary terms. As
more health care organizations convert to for-profit status,
entrepreneurial activities would occur when they vie for
market share and profits. In other cases, profit or benefits
cannot be measured by money. In not-for-profit health care
organizations, the benefit of medical treatment can be
assessed by organizational survival, reputation, growth
and opportunities. Thus, these scenarios also require 
multidimensional strategies and necessitate the use of
entrepreneurship in health care organizations. In fact, the
complex health care environment demands more innova-
tive solutions. Consequently, health care organizations are
beginning to utilize entrepreneurship in their management
techniques.
Another example of the applicability of entrepreneurship
to the health care industry is described by Chicken (2000).
He offers a number of entrepreneurial activities for a range
of industries. For instance, he finds these activities in
financial services (banking and insurance industries),
manufacturing, agriculture, transportation, mining, fishing,
hotels, media, civil services and government. He further
summarizes that entrepreneurial activities occur under
three circumstances. First, operations must be carried out
in the open market. Second, some operations must be
funded or subsidized by government. Third, operations
could be completely funded by government. Using this for-
mula, it is clear that entrepreneurial activities can occur in
the health care industry, since health care organizational
activities satisfy the first two criteria.
Moreover, Chicken suggests that there are many levels
of entrepreneurial activities and they depend on the level
of management responsibility (2000). For example, 
managers who are the decision-makers in the organiza-
tions must be prepared to react to changes in a flexible
and positive manner. Thus, in current times of uncertainty,
complexity, and resource scarcity, health care organiza-
tions rely on their managers to redefine their roles to
enable their organizations to gain the competitive edge.
The use of process-based managerial entrepreneurship
(Moon 1999) refers to the improvements in administrative
procedures, intraorganizational communications, and
introrganizational interactions. In other words, flexible
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decision-making processes, open channels of communi-
cation and simplification of work processes in organiza-
tional innovations are more readily used and have become
more important to health care organizations. These
processes are, in fact, entrepreneurship processes, 
as managers increase their entrepreneurial role to become
involved in risk-taking strategies and serve as agents of
change. Multidimensional steps are necessary to assess
the environment and organization prior to making changes
using innovative strategies. Indeed, entrepreneurship is
applicable to the health care industry as it has been suc-
cessfully utilized in other industries.
Conclusions
This study has made the linkage between entrepreneur-
ship and health care so that entrepreneurship should be
promoted by health care organizations to better their
chances of survival. The environment, organizational
structure, and strategies of health care organizations have
necessitated the use of entrepreneurship. Specifically,
reliance on the entrepreneurial manager is the key to sur-
viving difficult times and achieving success. While this
study only takes the first step in establishing the relevance
of entrepreneurship to health care, it serves as a bridge for
furthering that knowledge into health care.
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Following a successful career in industry, Dr. Douglas V.
Shick, a newly minted entrepreneur, established NRS
Associates, LLC, to perform consulting services based on
two highly technical computer-modeling programs. Doug
was heavily involved in the development of one program,
an innovative computer simulation software for modeling a
particular manufacturing process, through intrapreneurial
activity during his corporate experience. Doug established
his business on September 1, 2001, and on September 10
announced his services by e-mail to everyone he knew.
The unforeseen events of the next day, September 11,
produced some unexpected aftereffects that Doug had to
factor into his developing business.
In late spring 2002, Doug Shick was sitting in his homeoffice, thinking about adding another link to his compa-ny website. He looked at the Visa/MasterCard credit
card reader next to his computers and wondered how
soon—or long—it would be before he would ring up anoth-
er sale. What a six months it had been! He had made the
leap directly from industry to entrepreneurship. He had
worked through every imaginable business scenario
before setting up his new business venture—a high-tech-
nology consulting service based on two very sophisticated
computer analysis programs. He’d also spent 70 days as
a ski instructor, because of the unexpected downturn in the
economy. Skiing certainly wasn’t in his original business
plan—but then neither were the events of September 11.
Surprisingly, the skiing had brought forth some unexpect-
ed business-related benefits. Where, he wondered, would
his next lucky break come from?  
From Intrapreneurial Engineer to 
Prospective Entrepreneur
Doug’s Career in Industry
Doug has been involved in solving complex engineering
problems using state-of-the-art computing resources for
his entire professional life. Following receipt of his bache-
lor’s degree in physics in 1976 from Bates College in
Lewiston, Maine, he obtained both the master’s and the
Ph.D. degrees in mechanics in 1979 and 1984, respective-
ly, from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Between 1985
and 1990 he was first a post-doctoral fellow, and later a
research associate. In 1990 Doug left academe and
became employed by the Advanced Technology Center of
the Ingersoll-Rand Company in Torrington, Connecticut,
first as a research engineer, and later advancing to the
position of manager, engineering analysis and technical
services.
In his positions at Ingersoll-Rand, Doug further devel-
oped his skills in computer modeling and solving complex
technical problems, and also set up computer networks
within his department. The latter responsibilities required
him to coordinate his efforts with the corporate information
technology (IT) organization. In addition, he had special
assignments as part of his daily work routine, two of which
involved setting up and administering his department’s
annual operating and capital expenditure budgets.
Although these budgets had to follow established corpo-
rate guidelines, he nevertheless became very familiar with
budgeting and financial issues, especially when he sought
exceptions to the guidelines. In addition, he learned
human resource and people skills through various courses
and seminars and, more practically, from managing the 12
skilled people who worked directly for him. In these situa-
tions, his manager provided coaching and watched his
leadership skills improve over the years as Doug pro-
gressed through promotions from an individual contributor
to supervisory and then management-level positions. 
In performing corporate R&D, Doug had to generate
and develop ideas that would benefit some group of inter-
nal customers within the company. These customers were
usually the engineering departments in the manufacturing
divisions. Doug’s ideas might have their origin in a problem
that the customer was experiencing, or the idea might be
one of Doug’s own creation to advance the future capabil-
ities of the company. In each case, going forward required
Doug to generate a project proposal complete with
resource requirements, expected milestone completion
and project review dates with his customer, and the pro-
ject’s funding requirements. Finally, Doug had to “sell”
(obtain approval) this proposal to the engineering manag-
er of the department that would fund the project. Several
iterations of the project proposal between Doug and the
engineering manager to refine the details would not be
unusual. They needed to have confidence in Doug’s 
abilities to produce what he said he would produce, and
Doug needed to understand exactly what the division
wanted and how they would use the results from the proj-
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ect. Doug had a long string of successful projects that 
contributed to significant new business opportunities for
the company. 
First Thoughts of Entrepreneurship
Doug never intended to become an entrepreneur. He was
content with his career as an R&D engineering manager in
a Fortune 500 company. As a key contributor in his depart-
ment and as a respected manager, Doug was concerned
with the future direction of the company in general and his
department in particular. During the late 1990s and early
2000s, downturns in manufacturing resulted in several
restructuring events. Doug’s group was eventually affected
by these actions, and alternative arrangements were a hot
topic. On one assignment he worked with his current 
manager to develop “blue-sky ideas” as to what would be
involved with spinning off the R&D function of the compa-
ny and taking it private. The analysis showed that such a
scheme would be unrealistic. However, as Doug remem-
bers, “…that kind of got me thinking about doing this for
myself,…but at first the idea of doing it on my own 
wasn’t something that even really occurred to me.”  Doug
worked more on the idea of taking himself private, feeling
as he did that his future career path did not look as prom-
ising as it once did. Setting up a consulting business now
took on a growing appeal. Subsequently, Doug informed
his manager that he could consider Doug in any future
restructuring actions.
Interestingly, Doug’s intrapreneurial activities in industry
provided the pathway to entrepreneurship. His involve-
ment with developing a specialized software program, and
later working with a collaboration of intrapreneurs on the
same program, provided the impetus for him to consider
the possibility of making his entrepreneurial debut as a
consultant.
First, the Engineer as Intrapreneur:
NCMS and Heat Treat Distortion Prediction 
One of Doug’s extra responsibilities was as the Ingersoll-
Rand representative in a multipartner collaborative R&D
program under the auspices of the National Center for
Manufacturing Sciences (NCMS 2003). The collaboration
developed a software program, later christened Dante™,
which would subsequently become a key offering in
Doug’s business. Several years prior to becoming a mem-
ber of this collaboration, Doug had initiated his own R&D
project to try to solve the very problem that ultimately led
to the formation of the collaboration. The need for this R&D
was widely supported in his company. When the 
opportunity arose to join the NCMS collaboration, and
work with other highly talented team members from NCMS
member companies on this same problem, approval came
quickly. 
The Collaboration
NCMS forms and manages complex, multipartner, 
precompetitive collaborative R&D programs among its
member companies. An act of Congress, the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1984,
enabled the formation of NCMS. The goal of this collabo-
ration was to develop a software program that predicted
how a steel part of any geometry would change its shape,
or distort, after being subjected to the high temperatures
and rapid quenching that characterize the steel hardening
process. The primary reason to harden steel is to improve
wear resistance. Some aspects of hardening steel resem-
ble elements of the process used by the blacksmiths of a
bygone era when they heated a part to red/orange heat,
shaped it on their forge, and then quenched the part into a
liquid medium such as water, brine, or oil.   
For the most part during this collaboration, Doug
worked in his Ingersoll-Rand office—his assignments and
responsibilities to the NCMS collaboration were just other
items on his work agenda. He communicated with his col-
leagues on a regular basis and attended meetings at
NCMS headquarters or elsewhere as scheduled. Doug
also led a subteam during one phase of the program,
which further enhanced his management skills since none
of the members reported directly to him. Doug’s and his
colleagues’ innovative work on the software program was
much like that of a group of intrapreneurs innovating on
behalf of their respective organizations.  
A Major Decision
Once the software was successfully developed, the collab-
oration members made a unanimous decision to “commer-
cialize” the software and make it available to the public.
Following the evaluation of several alternatives, the collab-
oration team selected Deformation Control Technology
(DCT) (DCT 2003), one of the original collaboration 
partners, to perform this task. This commercialization
process made the code more user-friendly for potential
purchasers and users, compared to the raw code 
developed by the collaboration engineers. The Dante™
software worked in a professional manner like any other
high-technology software one might purchase or license
on the open market. Even though Dante™ would ultimate-
ly become available to the general public, the collaboration
members felt that they were still in the position of gaining
the maximum benefit from the software because of their
intense involvement with developing the original code and
understanding every nuance of the software. 
Doug and his collaboration partners brought a solution
to this complex problem to the point where it could now be
commercialized and then sold on the open market. Doug
had just experienced a major intrapreneurial event, thanks
to NCMS and ultimately the U.S. Congress! And Dante™
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As Doug thought about “taking himself private,” he first
evaluated his financial resources. Fortunately, Doug’s 
family situation was such that he didn’t need to generate
cash flow from “Day One.” He had been saving funds in
anticipation of starting his business enterprise, and he also
had a separation package from Ingersoll-Rand that he 
earmarked for setting up his business enterprise. His wife
had a stable, corporate position, and they had no children.
With his separation package and accumulated savings,
Doug had a “buffer” of about $65,000 to establish his busi-
ness enterprise and carry it through the start-up phase of
development. 
There were ongoing expenses associated with estab-
lishing his new business enterprise that were not trivial.
Actual fixed business expenses were approximately
$6,500 per quarter. There were a number of variable
expenses, such as travel to national technical society
meetings and meetings with prospective clients, but these
would be reduced to some extent by the potential for 
generating revenue. There were also some one-time fixed
expenses associated with setting up his home office. As a
potential source of future financing, Doug opened a home
equity line of credit on his Connecticut residence while he
was still employed. 
Business Planning and Evaluating Risks
After finally accepting that his current position no longer
held potential for advancement, Doug applied an analytical
process to study alternatives. He used commercially 
available business-planning software to analyze various
business scenarios to evaluate the risk of setting up a
business enterprise. “I started looking at what would it take
to make a go of it. Worked out some business plans and
assumptions . . . . that maybe the first month in business 
I might bill 35 hours, and ramped it up by 5 hours a month
until I was selling 80 hours a month, and then I would be
doing probably just about as well as I was doing before.”
He also evaluated the impact of different ramp rates as
well as the impact of taking three months before achieving
his first paying job, and even six months, attempting to be
conservative in his projections. 
Doug considered various hourly rates for his services,
ranging from $75–$100 per hour for routine or general
structural analyses to $125–$150 per hour for more
advanced premium analyses using Dante™. Since there
was more competition from other consultants providing
general structural analyses, he knew from his experience
with such consultants while in industry that he would have
to charge a lower hourly rate for these services. Doug
anticipated that this class of analysis would provide the
majority of his revenue. Doug also evaluated various ratios
of premium to routine analysis, still recognizing that the
majority of his analytical work would fall into the routine
category. After evaluating the results of the different sce-
narios, Doug was confident that he could be successful.
Before setting up his business, Doug sent his résumé to
several firms that provided computer analyses for their
business clients. This generated positive interest. Both as
a contingency plan and as a safety net, Doug felt that he
could obtain employment at this type of firm on relatively
short notice should he decide to abandon his business
enterprise in the future. 
Legal Organization
By now the desire to set up his business enterprise
became compelling. “The more I thought about it, the more
I wanted to be on my own. I’d be completely in control of
what I did …. sort of—in reality you do whatever anybody
will pay you for. The flexibility of working either in
Connecticut or in Vermont where we have a vacation
home was particularly appealing.”  
Doug read up on business types and organizations, and
how to start a company. Working with an attorney, he
formed a LLC (Limited Liability Corporation) organization
structure. He registered his new company using his home
address in Connecticut. 
Final Analysis
Doug was confident that he had realistically viewed his
prospects and evaluated the risk potential. Reflecting back
on the thought process he used to evaluate the present
and the future, Doug said: 
I tried to make sure I thought of things that could
go wrong, (to) try to identify the ones that would just
kill something, and (to) make sure that I knew either
how I can keep them from happening or how I would
respond in case they did. It wouldn’t be much fun to
be focusing constantly on the problems, and at the
same time it would be foolish not to worry about them
at all. I was pretty happy with the way things looked.
The element of risk was there, and I thought I had
considered every contingency. Even the worst case
was survivable. I like doing the technical work, but I
also like managing stuff and being the boss. This
business venture gives me both things. It’s my com-
pany that I have here. I get a charge out of looking at
my brochure that says ‘NRS Associates, Douglas
Shick, President.’ I talk about myself as the founder.
. . . But I hadn’t considered the impact of the tragic
events of September 11.
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Opening for Business
In August 2001 Doug left industry to start NRS Associates,
LLC. NRS stood for the phrase “Not Rocket Science.”
Doug explained his choice of name as follows. “A friend
said I should have something whimsical—and I sort of
thought something serious. So this way I can do both
things. I can be whimsical with Not Rocket Science and
serious with NRS.”  On Doug’s website,
www.nrsassoc.com (NRS 2003), he elaborated further on
the name NRS, writing, “In the words of our founder, ‘Okay,
maybe it’s Not Rocket Science, but it’s still awfully compli-
cated.’ Our mission is to provide simple solutions to the
complex problems faced by our clients.”  
Doug established his high-technology business venture
on September 1, 2001, and on September 10, he e-mailed
an announcement detailing his technical services to 
everyone he knew. In return, he had a number of congrat-
ulatory replies, as well as some significant leads.
NRS’s Services: Computer Modeling 
of Mechanical Components
Doug’s clients wanted to know whether—or when—a par-
ticular mechanical part will fail once in service. The news
media periodically carried stories of catastrophic failures;
for example, a tail-rudder failure that was suspected of
causing an airplane crash, but structural failures regularly
occurred on a more mundane level as well. Computer-
based analytical tools that predict how a virtual part or
component will respond under various service conditions
were an important part of providing reliable quality 
products. Structural modeling with computer simulation
software has replaced the need for real-time testing of
every component. Computer simulations provided the
information required to assess the likelihood that a given
component will fail in service. Many businesses had engi-
neers on staff with the expertise and experience to provide
such analyses, while others relied on consulting services
such as Doug’s on an as-needed basis. 
Structural Analyses 
Technical computer modeling or simulation is to the 
engineer what EXCEL™ or another business spreadsheet
program is to the business manager. Just as a business
manager performs a number of “what-if” analyses in 
studying a given business scenario, inserting different val-
ues of the business variables into the spreadsheet as part
of generating an understanding of that scenario, a design
engineer performs high-technology computer modeling or
simulation to gain an understanding of what is happening
to a given structure or component under load or other input
from its service environment. Seeing what happens to a
component under different conditions enables the 
engineer to make any needed design changes that
become evident during the analysis and to have confi-
dence in the final design of the component before actually
building a prototype. Finally, physical testing of the proto-
type through actual experimentation and comparing its
performance or response to its working environment with
the predictions from the computer model generates a very
high degree of confidence in the performance of that com-
ponent before manufacturing begins and the component
finally reaches a customer.
Home-Based Structure Modeling 
Solving structural analysis problems required an incredible
number of calculations. A decade ago, these calculations
required the use of mainframe computers, making it
impossible for the lone entrepreneur to set up his or her
own dedicated computing system. However, the tremen-
dous increase in computing power at reduced cost had
made it possible for individuals like Doug to have the 
ability to perform these complex computer analyses in
their own home. 
Doug leased a state-of-the-art workhorse computer
from Dell to perform the heavy computation, and a laptop
computer that would enable him to provide the input
parameters from any location at any time, whether from
the same room, a distant location such as a customer’s
office, or his family vacation home in upstate Vermont. The
laptop also displayed the final results. Quarterly computer
lease charges were about $1,200. A simple modem 
connection from his laptop computer provided the neces-
sary link from any off-site location to his office network and
workhorse computer very effectively. Other expenses,
such as dial-in access, cable Internet access, and web site
charges, were approximately $240 per quarter.
Doug Offers Two Services: 
ANSYS™ and Dante™
Doug’s company provided two services: routine or general
structural analysis and specialized or premium computer
modeling analysis. Each service required a different 
software program with different associated charges. 
ANSYS™
Doug licensed a software program from Ansys, Inc. (called
ANSYS™) that enabled him to analyze mechanical struc-
tures and components, and to make recommendations to
his customer about the ability of the component to safely
withstand the applied loads in service without undue stress
concentrations that would lead to premature failure of the
component (ANSYS 2003). Doug’s ANSYS™ license cost
about $5,000 per quarter. 
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Dante™
Doug was well aware that Dante™ represented a signifi-
cant advancement in the realm of computer analysis 
software. He recognized that moving Dante™ into the
marketplace would be a challenge—it was a high-technol-
ogy innovation in complex computer simulations not 
previously available in the marketplace. It was a first—it
was new to the world. “We’re dealing with customers who
didn’t know they needed it—I guess that’s what we’re kind
of struggling with . . . not struggling, but that’s the next
step. It’s a matter of finding the right customer and show-
ing them what it can do and they can figure out what to do 
with it.”  
Doug licensed Dante™ for his business enterprise from
DCT. Dante™ enabled Doug to predict for his customers
how a steel part would distort, or change its shape, during
the operation that involved hardening a steel component.
A way to predict this distortion would offer several options
to a manufacturer to minimize this effect. Dante™ can be
extremely important in new product development, bridging
the gap between product design engineers and manufac-
turing engineers. With Dante™ various designs and their
manufacturing consequences can be studied before a new
design was finalized and manufacturing was left with the
challenge of making the part. 
Doug had a second license from DCT to sell the
Dante™ software outright in the northeast region of the
United States. Because of this sales relationship with DCT,
Doug did not pay a fixed annual license fee for his busi-
ness use of Dante™, just royalties as a percentage of his
fees for jobs where he used Dante™. These royalties to
DCT acknowledged the intellectual property contained in
Dante™ that DCT developed during the commercialization
process.    
Marketing Plans and Networks
Doug established his website, www.nrsassoc.com, 
himself, at minimal cost by drawing on his overall IT com-
petency. He designed the website more as a means to
demonstrate the credibility of his business enterprise than
with the expectation that it would bring in cold leads. His
website described his services and also contained links to
other consultants, technical analysis software companies,
and laboratories that provided various kinds of services
that were complementary to Doug’s. He incorporated an IT
principle that the more sites that were linked to yours, the
more likely a search engine would think you were impor-
tant and place your site near the top of any search list. In
addition, Doug made sure that his homepage contained
important keywords that a person seeking his kinds of
services might use in their search. The benefit of these
strategies was that anyone who used a search engine to
search for these services was likely to find Doug’s website
relatively easily. Doug’s site met his expectations, “People
are finding me.”  
In Doug’s new entrepreneurial world, his highly refined
skill in preparing project proposals was critical to the suc-
cess of his venture. Doug’s new customers were largely
unknown, they were located everywhere, and they had no
prior working relationship with him. Marketing his entrepre-
neurial offering to these customers and generating sales
dollars constituted an area of unproven skill, and 
represented a major challenge for Doug.
As a consultant Doug expected to sell the capabilities of
Dante™ to high-technology customers in engineering and
manufacturing. But, since few in industry had heard about
Dante™, Doug knew that it would require some special
marketing skills to convince prospective customers of the
software’s benefits. Doug’s style was low-key: he was not
an overpowering glib sales promoter who was verbose but
really said little of substance. Doug spoke with authority,
chose his words carefully, and let every word count. When
marketing and selling technical services as a consultant,
Doug needed to convince a potential customer that his
overall competency and his computer modeling approach
to specifically solve their problem would provide the 
necessary and correct answers, just as he had to with his
customers in industry. In this respect, Doug’s technical
competence garnered sales.
Doug used word-of-mouth referrals among people in
the field to spread knowledge about his business enter-
prise. He had memberships in numerous professional
societies. Doug supported DCT at national technical 
society meetings by presenting various Dante™ analyses.
This has provided wide exposure of the technology to the
segment of the technical community most likely to have an
interest in Dante™. Members of these organizations 
constituted a major component of Doug’s network, and the
cornerstone of his marketing plan. Conventional 
widespread advertising in technical journals and publica-
tions, or initiating cold calls to potential companies, have
not proven effective in this field. 
Doug gathered additional name recognition in his field
by attending various ANSYS™ user-group meetings and
presenting solutions to various complex problems to new
analysts in the field (and their companies). As Doug stat-
ed, “My marketing plan is focused primarily on developing
leads through people I already know, and, more important,
who already know me.”  These referrals were critical to
Doug’s success. In this regard, Doug worked hard to get
his name and that of NRS Associates in front of people
who could use his services.   
In addition to pursuing his own leads and opportunities,
Doug had a number of contacts in his network whose
expertise complemented what he did, and it has already
provided an early source of revenue. In one instance the
consultant working on a job felt that there was more to the
failure of the part than just a heat treatment problem as
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suggested by the customer. This consultant felt that there
might actually be a design error. The customer agreed to
have Doug examine that possibility. Two phone conversa-
tions and some e-mail between sites in Connecticut, North
Carolina, and Indiana provided the information Doug
needed. Doug did all the work from his home office. His
analysis confirmed that the design of the part was at fault,
and he provided the information needed to make the part
sufficiently robust for this application. He needed no face-
to-face meetings with the various parties. 
If Not on the Links, Try the Slopes
The encouraging leads that Doug received in the replies to
his September 10 broadcast e-mail announcement dried
up completely, or were at least put on a very firm hold by
the events of September 11, and no further leads devel-
oped during 2001. The lack of solid business activity in
technology-depressed markets led Doug to informally
establish “NRS Associates, LLC–North” at the family vaca-
tion home in upstate Vermont. With his computer network
established, Doug could really work from any location. In
the meantime, while waiting for the business climate to
improve, he pursued potential leads by telephone or 
e-mail, and made visits as appropriate. 
With time on his hands during the winter of 2001–2002,
Doug decided to fulfill a long-time ambition. “I took a job as
a ski instructor this winter, partly because it’s been a
dream of mine to be a ski instructor ever since I was 10!  I
finally got my skiing up to a level where it made sense.”
However, 70 days of skiing and instructing in early 2002
were not spent passing time and having fun. 
The ski slope actually managed to generate a number
of promising leads in early 2002. His most promising lead
came from private ski lessons he provided to an 11-year-
old girl over the 2002 President’s Week. On the ski lift, he
learned that the girl’s father was a high-level engineering
manager at a firm to which Doug wanted to sell Dante™.
Doug met the father of the girl after the ski lesson and
arranged to speak to him at his company at a later date.
“He was the boss of all the people that I’ve been trying to
figure out who they are so that I can go try to sell Dante™
to them!”  Doug had left no snowflake unturned when it
came to developing new leads for any of his analytical
consulting services. 
Quartz Resonators – A Premium 
ANSYS™ Analysis
A second unexpected source of leads came through the
Internet, reminding Doug of the interconnectivity of 
websites. Much to his surprise, Doug recently had a tele-
phone call from Dan, a colleague from his university days.
Dan was surfing the web and came across Doug’s name,
and gave him a call. 
While a research associate at Rensselaer, Doug stud-
ied the mechanics of quartz resonators. Quartz resonators
were used in the electronics industry for both civilian and
military applications. Doug published three papers based
on this research, coauthored with the professor in charge
of this research. Dan was still working in the field and
brought Doug up to date about the significant advances
taking place in the field. He informed Doug that his early
papers on quartz resonators were some of the seminal
papers in the field, and that anybody working in the field
today still knew the name “Shick.” Even though ANSYS™
was the software code used to solve quartz resonator
problems, the solution required considerable knowledge
beyond routine structural analysis. This would enable
Doug to charge a premium rate for this class of analysis as
well.
Late Spring 2002
With the 2001–2002 ski season over, Doug was spending
more time in his office. He had imposed a sense of
urgency on himself. He says, “At the moment, all I have to
do now is get more work, and that is becoming more
urgent. Once I have a job, clients will impose urgency.
Typically I’ll give a promise date. I’ve gotten pretty good at
meeting those dates over the past few years. Learned my
lesson years ago!  In the meantime, I’ve never been hap-
pier. Except for the revenues, its great, best thing I’ve ever
done!”
Doug saw incipient signs of the business climate
improving, so there should be more positive market oppor-
tunities developing for his high-technology computer
analysis services. He was following up with earlier leads
again in the hope of opening up these opportunities.
Promoting Dante™ to organizations that did not know they
needed Dante™ continued to be an important next step,
as was researching the companies that were active in the
quartz resonator field. Doug planned to capitalize on his
name recognition in the quartz resonator technical com-
munity. These both involved premium-level analyses and
would go far in establishing a unique specialty for Doug’s
business enterprise. A competing firm could not easily
replicate these specialized analyses, which could also
generate leads for the routine ANSYS™ structural analy-
ses that Doug still felt would represent the majority of his
business. Doug was strongly motivated to market his
capabilities and to make his new business enterprise work.
He believed strongly that he had the talent to make it work,
and will leave no snowflake unturned to find that work,
reminding himself, “Now all I need is just a bit of 
good luck.” 
Epilogue
There was a lot more snow in the mountains and on the ski
slopes of upstate Vermont in the winter of 2002–2003 than
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in the previous winter, but Doug was doing less skiing.
Doug’s business was in the black, and in his words, he
was “off life support!”
Questions for Discussion
1. For most of his career Doug had few thoughts about
being an entrepreneur, but now he embraces his new
role enthusiastically. Which aspects of Doug’s personal-
ity appear to be helpful for his potential success as an
entrepreneur? Which aspects could be a hindrance?
2. Doug has accumulated a number of skills from his past
employment opportunities. Which of these skills con-
tribute to his success? What skills may he be lacking? If
so, how can he overcome this deficiency?
3. In many ways Doug is just another consultant who
advertises his services through the web and via his net-
work. His offering, however, has two unique services—
Dante’s™ distortion prediction and ANSYS’s™ quartz
resonator analysis. How best can he capitalize on
these?
4. What start-up activities did Doug initiate to establish his
new business enterprise?
5. Innovations can be considered to come in two broad
classes: incremental and radical. Where would you
slot Dante™? Are there potential benefits to being in
one class or the other?
6. What characteristics define intrapreneurship and entre-
preneurship? Distinguish between them.
7. Doug admits that his current revenues are not in line
with his original business plan. To what extent do you
think this is a direct result of the unexpected events of
September 11? Suggest how he might go about revis-
ing his plan after September 11, and deciding if and
when he should seriously consider abandoning his
own business and explore other options.
8. Doug’s IT experience enabled him to establish a pro-
fessional website at minimum cost. Visit his site
(www.nrsassoc.com), and review how Doug gives the
impression that he has a larger operation than a sin-
gle-person enterprise. In your opinion, is this deceit
ethical, or even good business? Give your reasons. 
9. Although Doug meticulously thought through all
aspects of his business before start-up, events did not
go according to plan. Now he recognizes that he could
use some help jump-starting his business in a techno-
logically depressed economy. What advice do you
have for Doug at this point in time?
10. Is Doug’s technical expertise sufficient?
Endnote
1. Teaching notes are available upon request from the author at WoodillaJE@sacredheart.edu.
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Half of a two-book series, International Franchisingin Emerging Markets: Central and Eastern Europeand Latin America, is a comprehensive, education-
al and yet practical collection of research and articles on
the topic of cross-border franchising. Edited by Dr. Ilan
Alon, associate professor of international business at
Crummer Graduate School of Business, Winter Park,
Florida, and Dianne H. B. Welsh, executive director of the
Muldoon Center for Entrepreneurship at John Carroll
University, the book begins with a general overview of
franchising as one of the most effective methods for pene-
trating international markets and follows with an academic
review of the political, social, economic, and technological
developments facilitating the spread of franchising in
developing regions. Most attention, however, is given to
specific accounts of the opportunities and 
challenges facing current and future franchisors in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin
America.
Through contributions from real-life franchisors and
franchisees, academic researchers, consultants, legal
experts and other authorities, the editors weave a dynam-
ic portrait of the current state of franchising in the emerg-
ing markets that combines theory and practice from both
global and local perspectives. For example, the first of two
chapters dedicated to Russia focuses on the overall 
conditions for franchising in the country and gives general
recommendations for entering that market, while the sec-
ond chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the opportu-
nities and threats in the Russian hospitality industry. A
similar approach is followed in the sections on Central
Europe and Latin America, while single chapters are dedi-
cated to Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Brazil, and Mexico.
The book has special impact not only because Alon and
Welsh are established authorities on franchising but also
because the articles they’ve selected are mostly written by
local practitioners and researchers who add realistic and
practical flavor to their writings, backing it with surveys,
interviews, and statistical data. Therefore, the appeal of
International Franchising in Emerging Markets: Central
and Eastern Europe and Latin America stretches beyond
academic circles to encompass business leaders, profes-
sionals, and entrepreneurs alike. 
The exponential growth in the franchising sector and
the frequent changes occurring in the developing countries
covered in this book guarantee that the research and
guidelines included here will soon have to be revised.
Nevertheless, Alon and Welsh’s compilation provides a
much-needed glimpse into the dynamics of a business
field and geographic regions that are often underrepre-
sented in business research, but soon should emerge as
some of the main sources for long-term growth for 
business.
The second part in this two-book series, International
Franchising in Emerging Markets: China, India and Other
Asian Countries, focuses on the Far and Middle East
regions. To be precise, almost half of the book is dedicat-
ed to the development of franchising in China, and that is
understandable, considering the importance this vast mar-
ket holds for Western businesses. Three of the rest of the
chapters focus on India, two on Kuwait, and one each on
Singapore and Kazakhstan. Another chapter takes a more
integrative approach in discussing restaurant franchising
in the Middle East, while the final discussion looks at fran-
chising in a global context, summarizing the findings and
patterns emerging from both books into comprehensive,
well-organized tables and bulleted lists.
The editors have selected a broad collection of articles
on China that take readers from the beginning of franchis-
ing there in 1994 with KFC and McDonald’s, to its evolu-
tion through the year 2000, its legal aspects, and its
prospects for the future. The section on China is inter-
spersed with articles examining real-life cases such as
those of the executive management firm Management
Recruiters International (MRI), California-based ITN, Inc.,
and a Chinese beauty parlor franchisor. 
The chapters on India focus more on academic
research and descriptive accounts of franchising in that
country since new market-based economic policy reforms
were enacted. The booming domestic franchise sector is
examined, as well as the unique character of Indian fran-
chises, which span from the traditional restaurant, hotel,
and soft drink sectors to original sectors such as health
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care, entertainment and education. Readers may find of
particular interest the results of a couple of surveys con-
ducted among franchisors in New Delhi and the general
public throughout India on the subject of franchising in
their country. 
The survey method was also used first in 1995 with 62
local franchisors and in 1999 with 140 current and poten-
tial franchisers in Singapore to measure the progress of
franchising as a business opportunity in that country, while
interviews conducted with franchising companies in
Kazakhstan were used to develop the market research
there. Although at different stages of franchise develop-
ment, both countries show encouraging signs for the 
success of their respective local franchising industries. 
The most intriguing part of the book deals with the pecu-
liarities of doing business as a franchise in the Middle
East. From the first overview chapter on the region to the
specific account of Starbucks’ entry in Kuwait and the
shoplifter situation at a Mercedes showroom, the section
reveals some of the unique economic, cultural, religious,
and managerial issues facing potential and current 
franchisors there.
Overall, Alon and Welsh deliver an authoritative and
wide-ranging account of the challenges and successes of
international franchising and the great potential this 
business sector has in the far-reaching corners of the
world in this age of globalization. 
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